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Abstract
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That
is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction’s
bidding language to truthfully express their strong-substitutes preferences over an arbitrary
number of goods, each of which is available in multiple discrete units. (Strong substitutes
preferences are also known, in other literatures, as M \-concave, matroidal and well-layered
maps, and valuated matroids). Our use of the bidding language, and the information it
provides, contrasts with existing algorithms that rely on access to a valuation or demand
oracle to find equilibrium.
We compute market-clearing prices using algorithms that apply existing submodular
minimisation methods. Allocating the supply among the bidders at these prices then requires
solving a novel constrained matching problem. Our algorithm iteratively simplifies the
allocation problem, perturbing bids and prices in a way that resolves tie-breaking choices
created by bids that can be accepted on more than one good. We provide practical running
time bounds on both price-finding and allocation, and illustrate experimentally that our
allocation mechanism is practical.
Keywords: bidding language, product-mix auction, competitive equilibrium, Walrasian equi-
librium, convex optimisation, strong substitutes, submodular minimisation
1 Introduction
This paper develops algorithms that solve product-mix auctions in which participants can make
bids that represent any strong-substitutes preferences for an arbitrary number of distinct goods.
(These preferences are also known, in other literatures, as M \-concave, matroidal and well-
layered maps, and valuated matroids). It thus allows bidders to express more general preferences
than could previously be permitted in these auctions, and finds competitive equilibrium prices
and quantities consistent with these, and the auctioneer’s preferences.
Importantly, therefore, our algorithms for finding equilibrium differ from existing ones in
that they directly use the information that the product-mix auction “language” provides. This
information is in a very different form from the information provided by a valuation or demand
oracle. This creates additional complexities, as well as simplifications which we can take ad-
vantage of. However, the language is conceptually simple, and easy for bidders to use in a
(product-mix) auction.
The product-mix auction was developed in 2007-8 for the Bank of England to provide liquidity
to financial institutions by auctioning loans to them [Klemperer, 2008]. It is now used at least
monthly by the Bank, and more often when institutions are more likely to be under stress. (After
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the 2016 vote for “Brexit”, and starting again on 5th March 2019, for instance, the auction was
run weekly.)
The original implementation of the auction allowed bidders to each submit a collection of
bids, where each bid has n + 1 elements: a price for each of the n goods available, and a total
quantity of goods sought by that bid.1 Figure 1a gives an example with two bids that each
demand a single good, in the case where n = 2.
The auction sets a uniform price for each good (i.e., every recipient of any particular good
pays the same price per unit for that good), and gives each bid an allocation that maximises
that bid’s “utility”, assuming quasilinear preferences. That is, each bid is allocated the good on
which its price strictly exceeds the auction’s price by most, if there is a unique such good, and
is allocated nothing if all its prices are strictly below the auction’s corresponding prices. (So if a
bid only wants one particular good, it simply sets prices of zero for all the other (n− 1) goods.)
A bid that creates a tie (i.e., two or more of its prices exceed the auction’s corresponding prices
by most, or none of its prices exceed, but at least one equals, the auction’s corresponding prices)
can be allocated in any way consistent with equilibrium (see below).
The auction’s prices are chosen to maximise the sum of the bids’ and auctioneer’s welfare
– that is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities.2 Moreover, the auctioneer
expresses his preferences about which goods to allocate in the form of supply functions which
can themselves be equivalently represented as (and so can be converted into) a collection of bids
of the kind described above.3
In versions of the product-mix auction thus far implemented, all bids are for positive quant-
ities of goods. In the quasi-linear preferences case, the market-clearing prices can then be found
by solving straightforward linear programs, and finding an allocation of the auctioneer’s supply
to the individual bidders is similarly straightforward. However, as discussed in Klemperer [2008],
some strong-substitutes preferences (over bundles of non-negative quantities of goods) can only
be expressed by using collections of bids for both positive and negative quantities; positive and
negative bids are required to express the demand correspondence in Figure 1b, for instance.4
Moreover, there are natural circumstances in which a bidder may wish to express such prefer-
ences5, and it has been shown that any strong-substitutes preferences can be represented using
1In the Bank of England’s auction, the bidders are commercial banks, etc., each good is a loan secured against
one of n different specified qualities of collateral (so the prices are interest rates), and the quantity is the amount
of the loan (in £).
2Specifically, the auction finds the lowest such price vector. Since the bids automatically express “strong
substitutes” preferences for all bidders (see Baldwin and Klemperer [2019b]), there exist equilibrium price
vectors, and also a unique one among them at which every good’s price is lowest.
3See Appendix 1E of Klemperer [2018] for how to convert supply functions into collections of bids. (The
bids that the auctioneer’s supply functions would be converted into would ensure that it sells more units on a
good when prices are high, analogous to a buyer buying fewer units in this case.) Although the auctioneer’s
preferences could equivalently have been represented as a collection of bids of the kind made by the bidders,
describing them simply as two-dimensional graphs of “supply schedules” was an important feature of the auction
design: participants’ ability to express their preferences in the ways that are most natural for them is crucial
to getting an auction accepted for practical use, to getting bidders to participate, and to the auction working
efficiently.
The Bank of England’s original program restricted to n = 2. Since 2014 its program permits much larger n (it
is currently being run with n = 3), and it also allows richer forms of preferences to be expressed by the auctioneer
(but not by the bidders, whose preference expression has, by contrast, been restricted in recent auctions). A
variant that allowed for bidders’ budget constraints (hence non-quasilinear preferences) was programmed for the
Government of Iceland in 2015-16.
See Klemperer [2008, 2010, 2018] and Baldwin and Klemperer [2019b] for full discussion.
4Strong-substitutes preferences are those that would be ordinary substitutes preferences if we treated every
unit of every good as a separate good. Such preferences have many attractive properties; they mean, for example,
that if the price of any one good increases, and the demand for it decreases, then the demand for all other goods
can increase by at most the amount of that decrease. Strong substitutability is equivalent to M \-concavity
[Shioura and Tamura, 2015]. See Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a] for a discussion of the relationship between
“strong” and “ordinary” substitutes.
5See Klemperer [2008]. Such preferences were not relevant to the Bank of England’s application (see Klemperer
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collections of positive and negative bids.6
The use of the product-mix bidding language to express preferences is, thus, both conceptu-
ally simple and natural. The algorithms presented in this paper exploit the fact that it allows
for the efficient computation of a demanded bundle as well as the indirect utility derived at
any given prices. On the other hand, computing the aggregate value of a given bundle is not
straightforward using the information that the bidding language provides.
Conversely, we note that Murota [2003] and others work in a valuation oracle setting, which
assumes that we have access to bidder preferences only through oracle access to the valuations
of each bidder. This setting provides no straightforward way to compute a demanded bundle or
the indirect utility function at given prices. Our bidding-language setting is somewhat analogous
to but more informative than the demand oracle setting of Ausubel [2006] and Paes Leme and
Wong [2017], which presupposes access to an oracle returning a demanded bundle at given prices.
Our contributions This paper addresses the computational challenges of determining uni-
form component-wise minimal market-clearing prices (at which total market demands equal the
quantities of each good that are available) and allocating a fixed collection of the goods at
these prices, to bidders whose bids are collections of positive and negative bids that express
strong-substitute preferences.
Section 2 introduces the product-mix auction’s strong-substitutes bidding language in more
detail, and develops some of its properties. A first contribution of our paper is to show that it
is co-NP-complete to determine whether a given list of positive and negative bids constitute a
valid demand correspondence.
In Section 3, we consider algorithms for finding component-wise minimal market-clearing
prices that have practical running time bounds (ruling out the ellipsoid method, which can in
principle be applied [Paes Leme and Wong, 2017]). We adopt a discrete steepest descent method
from the discrete optimisation literature [Murota, 2003, Shioura, 2017] that employs submodular
minimisation to find the steepest descent directions and present two techniques that reduce the
number of iterations required by taking long steps in the steepest descent direction. For both
techniques we see that the number of iterations is polynomial in the input size and, since
submodular minimisation is rapid in practice [Chakrabarty et al., 2017], we expect our approach
to have a fast running time. Indeed, preliminary experiments suggest our method performs well
in practice.
Our main contribution, given in Section 4, is an efficient polynomial-time algorithm that
allocates the auctioneer’s chosen supply among the bidders at given market-clearing prices. The
difficulty in developing this lies in handling bids whose utility is maximised on more than one
alternative good (or whose utility from its most-preferred good is exactly zero), as tie-breaking
choices interact with each other. This gives rise to a novel matching problem. Our algorithm
proceeds by iteratively simplifying the allocation problem at hand, allocating unambiguous bids
and perturbing bids and prices in a way that resolves a subset of the tie-breaks and yields a
simplified allocation problem. Progress is measured in terms of reductions in the number of
edges of a multigraph associated with the allocation problems.
Our price-finding and allocation algorithms are conceptually simple. They are also straight-
forward to implement, which has allowed us to develop two practical implementations in Haskell
and Python; these can be found at http://pma.nuff.ox.ac.uk. and https://github.com/
edwinlock/product-mix, respectively. Appendix A presents the results of experiments demon-
strating that our allocation algorithm is efficient in practice for realistic numbers of goods,
bidders and bids.
2018).
6See [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2019b]. This work was also described in Baldwin et al. [2016]; Klemperer [2010]
noted the result for n = 2.
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Related work Our work continues a long literature, spanning economics and discrete convex
analysis, on “gross” and “strong substitutes” [Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Milgrom and Strulovici,
2009] and “M \-concavity” [Murota and Shioura, 1999]. While the discrete convex analysis liter-
ature generally allows multiple units of each good, much focus in economics has been on the case
in which there is only one unit of each good; Milgrom and Strulovici [2009] showed that “strong
substitutes” provide the suitable generalisation of gross substitutes to the multi-unit case, re-
taining existence of equilibrium while insisting that any two units of the same good should have
the same price.
Algorithms to compute equilibrium prices in these contexts go back to Kelso and Crawford
[1982], Murota [2000] and Ausubel [2006]; see Shioura and Tamura [2015], Murota [2016] and
Paes Leme [2017] for recent surveys. Market-clearing prices are commonly found either by
performing a discrete steepest-descent search or by solving a convex optimisation by means of
an improved cutting plane method of Lee et al. [2015] (cf. Paes Leme and Wong [2017]). We
note that to the best of our knowledge, the cutting plane method has not yet been implemented
and may be computationally expensive in practice; moreover, solving the convex optimisation
problem is not guaranteed to find component-wise minimal prices. While the steepest-descent
methods described in the literature run in pseudo-polynomial time in the valuation and demand
oracle settings, as compared to the fully polynomial algorithm of Paes Leme andWong [2017], our
steepest descent algorithm uses long steps and exploits the bid representation of bidder demand
to close this gap, yielding a competitive fully polynomial algorithm in the bidding-language
setting.
Significantly, whereas previous literature has developed algorithms for finding market-clearing
prices, few have addressed the (harder) problem of finding a valid allocation of goods, given those
prices. One such work is Murota [2003], which presents an algorithm that works in the multi-
unit case by reducing the allocation problem to a network flow problem and relies on oracle
access to the valuation function of each bidder. Paes Leme and Wong [2017] provides a different
algorithm, also in the valuation oracle setting, but this is only applicable in the case in which
there is only one unit of each good. We elaborate on this in Section 2.4.
As the computation of a bidder’s valuation of a given bundle is expensive in our bidding-
language setting, running the algorithm of Murota [2003] to solve the allocation problem for
product-mix auctions would incur a significant cost for each query to the valuation oracle. In
contrast, our algorithms directly exploit the specific representation provided by the product-mix
auction’s bidding language to find both prices and allocations.
2 Preliminaries
For notational convenience, we denote [n] := {1, . . . , n} and [n]0 := {0, . . . , n}. In our auction
model, there are n distinct goods numbered from 1 to n; a single copy of a good is an item. A
bundle of goods, typically denoted by x,y or z in this paper, is a vector in Zn whose i-th entry
denotes the number of items of good i. The target bundle t is a bundle the auctioneer wants to
allocate amongst the bidders. Vectors p, q ∈ Rn typically denote vectors of prices, with a price
entry for each of the n goods. We write p ≤ q when the inequality holds component-wise. It
is often convenient to regard a rejected bid as being accepted on a notional “reject” good for
which bids and prices are always zero. Letting the reject good be 0, the set of goods is then
[n]0. In this setting, we identify bundles and prices with the n+ 1-dimensional vectors obtained
by adding a 0-th entry of value 0.
A valuation u is a function that maps bundles to non-negative real numbers. We assume
that bidders have quasi-linear utilities, i.e. the utility derived from bundle x at price p by a
bidder with valuation u is given by
u(x)− p.x. (1)
Any valuation u is associated with a demand correspondence Du that maps p to the set of
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bundles that maximise (1). We omit the subscript u if the intended valuation is clear from
context.
For any subset X ⊆ [n], eX denotes the characteristic vector of X, i.e. an n-dimensional
vector whose i-th entry is 1 if i ∈ X, 0 otherwise. Furthermore, ei denotes the vector whose i-th
entry is 1 and other entries are 0.
A set function f : 2[n] → Z is submodular if it satisfies f(S) + f(T ) ≥ f(S ∪ T ) + f(S ∩ T )
for all S, T ⊆ V . Submodular function minimisation (SFM) is the task of finding a minimiser
of a submodular function. It is well-known that the minimisers of submodular functions form a
lattice; that is, if S and T are minimisers of f , then so are S∪T and S∩T . SFM can be solved in
polynomial time using the improved cutting plane method of Lee et al. [2015]. For SFM that is
efficient in practice, we refer to two SFM algorithms from the literature. The subgradient descent
approach by Chakrabarty et al. [2017] determines a minimiser in time O(nF 3γ log n), while the
Fujishige-Wolfe algorithm described by Chakrabarty et al. [2014] takes time O(F 2(n2γ + n3)),
where F is an upper bound on the absolute value of f and γ denotes the time it takes to
query f . Experimental results [Chakrabarty et al., 2014] indicate that the running time of the
Fujishige-Wolfe algorithm depends less on F than suggested by the above bound.
For the price-finding algorithms described in Section 3, we require a subroutine that finds
the inclusion-wise minimal minimiser. Note that such a subroutine can be obtained by calling
any SFM algorithm n + 1 times. Indeed, let S be a minimiser of f and, for every v ∈ S, let
Sv be the submodular minimiser of the function f restricted to [n] \ {v}. Then if S0 denotes
the minimal minimiser of f , we have v ∈ S0 if and only if f(Sv) > f(S), as the minimisers of a
submodular function form a lattice. Hence, we obtain S0 := {v ∈ S | f(Sv) > f(S)}.
2.1 Strong substitutes valuation functions
In this paper, we assume that bidders have strong substitutes valuations. We review some basic
properties of strong-substitutes (SS) valuations. A SS valuation divides price space into regions
corresponding to bundles: any bundle x has a price region where x is demanded, possibly along
with other bundles (see Figure 1). It is known [Murota, 2003, Theorem 11.16] that each such
region is a convex lattice. When a demand region for some bundle x has full dimensionality, in
its interior x is the only bundle demanded; we call this interior a unique demand region (UDR).
Definition 2.1. A valuation u is ordinary substitutes if, for any prices p′ ≥ p with Du(p) =
{x} and Du(p′) = {x′}, we have x′k ≥ xk for all k such that pk = p′k. A valuation u is strong
substitutes (SS) if, when we consider every unit of every good to be a separate good, u is ordinary
substitutes.
Definition 2.1 for strong substitutes is equivalent to the definition of Milgrom and Strulovici
[2009] and also to M \-concavity [Murota and Shioura, 1999]: see footnote 4. It is equivalent to
gross substitutes (GS) [Kelso and Crawford, 1982] if there is only one item of each good.
While GS guarantees that a competitive equilibrium exists in single-unit auction markets,
the condition is not sufficient for the existence of such an equilibrium in the multi-unit case
(Shioura and Tamura 2015 give an example). SS represents a generalisation of single-unit GS
that provides a general sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium. We refer to
Shioura and Tamura [2015] for a detailed discussion on the distinction between GS and SS
valuations.
Definition 2.2. The indirect utility function fu of valuation u maps a price vector p to the
utility that a bidder with demand Du has for receiving her preferred bundle at a given price
vector p in the following way.
fu(p) := u(x)− p.x, where x ∈ Du(p). (2)
We note that the indirect utility function of SS valuations is convex, piecewise-linear and con-
tinuous.
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(b) Bob’s demand
positive bid negative bid
Figure 1: Example of strong-substitutes demand correspondences with two goods {1,2} belonging to two
bidders, Alice and Bob. Positive and negative bids are denoted by solid and hollow circles, respectively.
Price space is divided into regions corresponding to demanded bundles (x1, x2), with xi denoting the
number of items of good i. At p = (4, 4), Alice demands {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 2)} and Bob demands
{(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}, the discrete convex hulls of bundles demanded in the regions surrounding p.
2.2 Representing strong substitutes valuations with weighted bids
We describe how every strong substitutes valuation function can be represented by a finite list
B of positive and negative bids. A bid consists of an n-dimensional vector b ∈ Zn and a weight
w(b) = ±1.7 In this section we define a demand correspondence DB mapping each price vector
p to a set of bundles demanded at p, and an indirect utility function fB associated with B.
A bid b demands good i ∈ [n]0 if the surplus bi − pi at price p is maximal, that is if we
have i ∈ arg maxi∈[n]0(bi − pi); recall that good 0 is the notional “reject” good. We say that
arg maxi∈[n]0 (bi − pi) is the set of demanded goods of b at p. A bid b is marginal (on the set
of its demanded goods) at p if b demands more than one good at p. We say that a price p is
marginal if there are bids marginal at p and non-marginal otherwise.
Define the demand correspondence DB(p) at prices p as follows. If p is non-marginal, the
unique bundle demanded at p is obtained by adding an amount w(b) of i(b) to the bundle for
each b ∈ B, where i(b) is good b demands at p. If p is marginal, DB(p) consists of the discrete
convex hull of the bundles demanded at non-marginal prices arbitrarily close to p, where the
discrete convex hull of a set of bundles X is defined as conv(X) ∩ Z. In general, this implies
that we cannot independently allocate to bids one of the goods they demand, as this may result
in bundles that are not in DB(p). (In Figure 1b we see that at prices p = (4, 4), allocating the
negative bid a negative item of good 1, the positive bid at (4,2) a positive item of good 1 and
the other two positive bids a positive item of good 2 leads to a total bundle of (0, 2) 6∈ DB(p).)
The indirect utility function fB associated with B is given by
fB(p) =
∑
b∈B
w(b) max
i∈[n]0
(bi − pi). (3)
From (3) it is clear that we can compute fB(p) efficiently. In our setting, it is also straightfor-
ward to compute a bundle demanded at a given price p. This demand oracle problem is noted in
Paes Leme [2017] as an algorithmic primitive needed to implement the Walrasian tâtonnement
procedure. If p is non-marginal, simply allocate each bid a positive or negative item of its
demanded good and add up the items to obtain the demanded bundle. If p is marginal, care
7We restrict ourselves to positive and negative unit weights. This is without loss of generality, as any bid with
a weight of w(b) ∈ Z can be represented by w(b) unit bids with the same vector and of the same sign.
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must be taken to accept bids in a consistent way; one way to do this is to perturb entries of the
price vector slightly so as to break ties, then note that the resulting bundle is demanded at the
unperturbed prices. Note that a demand oracle does not provide us with a way to tell whether
a given bundle of interest is demanded at p.
A result by Baldwin and Klemperer [2019b] shows that any SS demand correspondence can be
represented as a finite list of positive and negative dot bids, and this representation is essentially
unique (up to redundancies). Conversely, however, not all lists of positive and negative bids
induce a strong substitutes valuation function. We call a bid list valid if the indirect utility
function fB defined in (3) is convex; Theorem 2.3 gives two further equivalent characterisations
of validity. The proof is given in Appendix B. In Section 4, we will also introduce a weaker local
notion of validity by introducing local validity in the ε-neighbourhood of a price p.
Theorem 2.3. Let B be a list of positive and negative bids and fB be the associated utility
function as defined in (3). The following conditions are equivalent.
1. B is valid.
2. There is no price vector p and pair of distinct goods i, i′ ∈ [n]0 at which the weights of the
bids marginal on i and i′ sum to a negative number.
3. fB is the indirect utility function of a strong substitutes valuation with quasi-linear utilities.
2.3 Deciding validity of bid lists
In our auction, bidders submit their lists of positive and negative bids to the auctioneer prior to
the auction. We show in Theorem 2.4 that checking the validity of a given list of bids is compu-
tationally hard. The proof (in Appendix C) exploits definition (2) of validity in Theorem 2.3.
Theorem 2.4. The problem of deciding the validity of a given list of positive and negative bids
is co-NP-complete.
However, in Appendix C we present a simple algorithm that verifies the validity of a given
list of bids; Theorem C.11 shows that its running time is polynomial if the number of goods,
or the number of negative bids, is bounded by a constant. Furthermore, many useful subclasses
of sets of bids (of arbitrary size) are easily checkable for validity in practice. Hence, while the
co-NP-completeness result is disappointing, it does not seem to be an important limitation on
the auction, as sensible restrictions on the permitted bids can allow us to check validity efficiently
in practice.
2.4 The computational challenges
In this subsection we state the computational problems to be solved. For any bidder j ∈ J ,
where J is the set of bidders, Bj denotes the bids of bidder j. We assume each Bj is valid,
as defined in Section 2.2, and provided as a list of vectors encoded in binary. Let B be the
aggregate list of bids obtained by aggregating the lists of all bidders. As the aggregation of
strong substitutes valuation functions is strong substitutes, B is valid. (Figure 2a depicts the
aggregate bid list of Alice and Bob from Figure 1.) The running times of our algorithms will be
given in terms of n, |J |, |B| and M := maxb∈B ‖b‖∞, the maximum bid vector entry.
Suppose the auctioneer intends to sell target bundle t. Our aim is to compute a competitive
equilibrium. That is, a market-clearing price p at which t is demanded and an allocation of t to
the various bidders so that every bidder receives a bundle they demand at p. In the event that
not enough bids are made for the target bundle available, some items can go unsold, which is
equivalent to the auctioneer buying them back from the market. To reflect this, the auctioneer
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places a total of ‖t‖1 positive bids at 0.8 The challenge of computing a competitive equilibrium
can be separated into two problems.
1. The price-finding problem. Given the aggregate bid list B and target bundle t, find the
coordinate-wise minimalmarket-clearing price p at which t is demanded, that is t ∈ DB(p).
2. The allocation problem. Given a valid bid list Bj for each bidder j ∈ J , a target bundle t
and market-clearing price p, allocate t to the bidders so that each bidder receives a bundle
they demand at p, that is, a partition (tj)j∈J of t with tj ∈ DBj for all j ∈ J .
Note that we do not ask for a breakdown of which of j’s bids are accepted on which goods.9
Indeed, we show that a solution to the allocation problem can be obtained without this know-
ledge.
Theorem 2.5 (Danilov et al. 2001). (see also Murota 2003 and Milgrom and Strulovici 2009)
Suppose that each bidder j ∈ J has SS demand correspondence Dj, and let D be the aggregate
demand from all bidders. Given a target allocation t and a market-clearing price p for t, there
exists a partition t =
∑
j∈J t
j such that tj ∈ Dj(p).
Theorem 2.5 ensures that if the target bundle t is aggregately demanded at market-clearing
price p, then there exists an allocation of t among the bidders so that every bidder receives
a bundle she demands. However, care must be taken in finding such an allocation, as bidders
cannot simply be allocated an arbitrary bundle they demand at the market-clearing price. (In-
deed, in Figure 1 the lowest prices at which Alice and Bob aggregately demand (1, 1) is given
by p = (4, 4). If we allocate Alice the whole bundle (1, 1), Bob does not demand the empty
remainder (0, 0) at p.)
Working in the valuation oracle setting, Paes Leme and Wong [2017] present an algorithm
that solves the allocation problem if there exist prices at which the target bundle is uniquely
demanded. Such prices are guaranteed in the single-unit case (i.e. when there is only one unit of
every good) but need not exist in the multi-unit case. (Indeed, the bundle (1, 1) is not uniquely
demanded at any prices for the aggregate demand correspondence of Alice and Bob defined in
Figure 1, and shown in Figure 2a.)
If we had (oracle) access to the valuations of the bidders, we could perturb the valuations such
that the target bundle is uniquely demanded at some price by subtracting carefully constructed
functions that are discrete-convex in one variable.10 However, recall that our bidding language
does not give straightforward access to bidder valuations.11 Moreover, is not clear how to perturb
the bids individually to achieve a suitable “indirect” perturbation of the valuations. Instead, our
allocation algorithm takes the approach of perturbing bids bidder by bidder.
Some intuition can be gained by considering the addition of a small “random” perturbation
vector vj to all the bids in bid set Bj (a different vj for each j ∈ J) and recomputing the new
market-clearing prices. This has the effect of breaking ties between bids in two different bid
sets. (This also uses the plausible fact, established in Proposition 4.14, that small perturbations
8Of course, any positive reserve price can reflected by appropriately locating the auctioneer’s bids.
9Once a partition of t has been obtained, it is easy to compute such a breakdown since the task can be
formulated as a maximum network flow problem, in which each positive bid b is a source node with outgoing
flow given by its weight w(b). There are n + 1 intermediate nodes, one node vi for each good i, including the
“reject” good 0. Connect each positive bid node to the goods on which it may be accepted. Each vi is connected
to a sink node whose incoming flow is the i-th element of tj . (For i = 0 the incoming flow is given by the total
weight of bids minus the number of elements of tj .) Each negative bid b is a sink node whose flow is its weight
w(b), and is connected to any vi for which b demands good i.
10See Murota (2003) Theorem 6.13 (4).
11To the best of our knowledge, the most efficient way to compute the valuation of bundle x is to determine a
price p at which x is demanded using our price-finding algorithm from Section 3, computing the indirect utility
fB(p) at this price and then solving (2) for u(x).
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make only small changes to the market clearing price(s).) However, the perturbations need to be
exponentially small in order to ensure that all possible ties are broken. (One can check, noting
the pigeonhole principle, that if perturbations are multiples of some inverse-polynomial, then
they will have distinct subsets having the same sum, losing the guarantee that all possible ties are
broken.) Our algorithm of Section 4 avoids this by systematically perturbing and un-perturbing
bid sets, making decisions on marginal bids as it proceeds.
A desideratum that we do not address here is fairness of allocation, in the sense that equal
bidders should be treated equally. Note that this is in conflict with our requirement that bids
should be allocated entirely or not at all: in the simplest configuration where two bidders offer
the same price for a single available item, one of those bidders will have their bid allocated and
other will not.
3 Finding market-clearing prices
We discuss two iterative steepest descent algorithms MinUp and LongStepMinUp from Sh-
ioura [2017] that determine a minimal minimiser of an L\-convex function. Both algorithms use
the SFM subroutine described in Section 2 to find the component-wise minimal discrete steepest
descent direction. For the second algorithm, we present two methods of computing step lengths
and show that both methods yield a polynomial running time in our bidding-language setting.
In order to apply the steepest descent method to our price-finding problem, we define a Lya-
punov function g and note in Proposition 3.1 that its restriction to Zn+ is L\-convex. Moreover,
Lemma 3.2 states that the lowest market-clearing price is integral and finding it reduces to
determining the minimal minimiser of g. This approach generalises an algorithm used by Aus-
ubel’s ascending auction design [Ausubel, 2006] and in Gul et al. [2000] for the task of finding
an equilibrium price in single-unit markets.
The Lyapunov function with regard to utility function fu and target bundle t is defined as
gt(p) := fu(p)+t.p. We suppress the subscript t if it is clear from context. Using our knowledge
of the aggregate bid list B and (3), we can write gt as
gt(p) :=
∑
b∈B
w(b) max
i∈[n]0
(bi − pi) + t.p. (4)
From (4) it is clear that we can evaluate g at any price p in time O(n|B|).
A function f : Zn → R is L\-convex if it satisfies the translation submodularity property,
f(p) + f(q) ≥ f((p− α1)) ∨ q) + f(p ∧ (q + α1)) (∀p, q ∈ Zn+, ∀α ∈ Z+). (5)
Here, ∨ and ∧ denote the component-wise maximum and minimum, respectively.
The following proposition and lemma demonstrate that we can use algorithms for minimising
L\-convex functions to find the minimal price p∗ at which t is demanded.
Proposition 3.1 (Murota 2003). The Lyapunov function g restricted to Zn+ is L\-convex.
Proof. It is known that the indirect utility function fu restricted to Zn is L\-convex if and only
if the valuation function u is strong substitutes (cf. Theorem 7.1 in Shioura and Tamura 2015.)
Secondly, note that ((p − α1) ∨ q)i ≤ max{pi, qi} and (p ∧ (q + α1))i ≤ min{pi, qi} for any
i ∈ [n], so
t.((p− α1) ∨ q + p ∧ (q + α1)) ≤ t.(p + q).
Together with the L\-convexity of fu and rewriting g(x) as fu(x) + t.x for all occurrences of g
in (5), this implies that g is L\-convex.
Lemma 3.2. The Lyapunov function g with regard to a valid (integral) bid list and any target
bundle t is convex, and p is a minimiser of g if and only if it is a market-clearing price for
target bundle t. Moreover, the minimal minimiser of g is integral.
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Proof. The first statement is immediate from the fact that fB is convex and t.p is a linear
term. To see the second statement, note that for any market-clearing price p of target bundle
t, we have g(p) = u(t), whereas for any price p at which t is not demanded, we have g(p) =
maxx∈D(p)(u(p) − x.p) + t.p > u(t). Here u is the valuation function as defined in Section 2
and we use (2).
Finally, the integrality of the minimal minimiser of g follows from the fact that if t is
demanded at p, then t is also demanded at bpc. To see this, fix a bid b and note that if
b demands good i at p, it still demands i at bpc. Indeed, as b demands i at p, we have
bj − pj ≤ bi − pi for all goods j, which implies
bj − bpjc < bj − pj + 1 ≤ bi − pi + 1 ≤ bi − bpic+ 1.
Due to the integrality of the bids and prices in bpc, this implies bj − bpjc ≤ bi − bpic.
Let p be a point that is dominated by some minimiser of g. Shioura [2017] noted that p
minimises g if and only if g(p) ≤ g(p + eS) for every S ⊆ [n]. For any integral point p ∈ Zn+
and S ⊆ [n], let the slope function g′(p;S) := g(p + eS) − g(p) denote the amount by which
p decreases when moving in the direction of eS . If S minimises g′(p;S), we call eS a steepest
descent direction. For any integral vector p, the L\-convexity of g implies that g′(p;S) is an
integral submodular function [Murota and Shioura, 2014, Theorem 7.2] and hence there exists
a unique component-wise minimal steepest descent direction eS0 .
Let p∗ be the minimal minimiser of g. If p is dominated by p∗ and we move in the minimal
steepest descent direction, the point p + eS0 is also dominated by p∗. This suggests algorithm
MinUp12, which iterates a point p by moving by some step eS0 , all the while remaining domin-
ated by p∗, until p = p∗.
MinUp
Step 1 Pick a point p ≤ p∗.
Step 2 Find the inclusion-wise minimal set S0 ∈ [n] minimising g′(p;S).
Step 3 If S = ∅, return p. Else set p = p + eS and go to Step 2.
By the existence of the auctioneer’s reserve bids, we can initialise p to 0. For this starting
point, running time analysis by Murota and Shioura [2014] implies that MinUp iterates exactly
‖p∗‖∞ times. As we know that p∗ is bounded from above by the component-wise maximum over
all bids B, the number of iterations is at most M := maxb∈B ‖b‖∞. In each iteration of Step
2, we can determine S0 using the SFM subroutine described in Section 2 that finds a minimal
minimiser of a given function in time T (n). This leads to the following running time forMinUp.
Theorem 3.3 (cf. Murota and Shioura 2014). The algorithm MinUp finds the component-
wise minimal market-clearing price in time O(MnT (n)), where T (n) denotes the time it takes
to find a submodular minimiser of g′.
We note that the running time of the two practical SFM algorithms mentioned in Section 2
is given with respect to an upper bound on the absolute value of the objective function. In order
to provide such an upper bound for our slope function g′, observe that the two points p and
p + eS share a demanded bundle x, for any p and S ⊆ [n]. As every bid contributes at most
one item to t and x, this implies g′(p;S) = (t− x)eS ≤ |B|.
12This algorithm is called GreedyUpMinimal in Shioura [2017].
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(b) The Lyapunov function g for target bundle t =
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Figure 2: Figure (a) shows the demand of the aggregate bid list obtained by aggregating Alice’s and
Bob’s bids from Figure 1, while (b) depicts a contour plot of the Lyapunov function g for target bundle
t = (1, 1). Note that p = (4, 4) is the minimal market-clearing price for t. Starting at 0, MinUp
repeatedly moves in direction d = (1, 1) until it reaches p, whereas LongStepMinUp makes a single
long step from 0 to p.
3.1 Longer step sizes
The analysis by Murota and Shioura [2014] shows thatMinUp performs optimally for an iterative
algorithm that is constrained to steps with an L∞-size of at most 1. As described by Shioura
[2017], we can, however, exploit monotonicity properties of the function g′(p;S0) in order to
increase step sizes without changing the trajectory of p as the algorithm runs. This reduces the
number of SFM subroutine calls, the most expensive part of the algorithm. In particular, if eS0
denotes the minimal steepest descent direction at p, we take a single long step λeS0 for some
λ ∈ Z+ that is equivalent to several consecutive steps of MinUp in the same direction eS0 .
We follow Shioura [2017] in choosing step length
λ(p, S0) = max{λ ∈ Z+ | g′(p;S0) = g′(p+ (λ− 1)eS0 ;S0)},
that is, the farthest distance we can move before the slope
g′(p + (λ− 1)eS0 ;S0) = g(p + λeS0)− g(p + (λ− 1)eS0) (6)
in the direction of eS0 changes. This leads to the following algorithm.13 Below we will give
two methods to compute (6).
LongStepMinUp
Step 1 Pick p ≤ p∗.
Step 2 Compute the inclusion-wise minimal minimiser S0 ⊆ [n] of g′(p;S) and λ(p, S0) as
defined by (6).
Step 3 If S0 = ∅, return p. Otherwise set p = p + λ(p, S0)eS0 and go to Step 2.
Note that the values of p follow the same trajectory for MinUp and LongStepMinUp.
This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.5, which rests on the monotonicity properties of
g′(p, S0) stated in Proposition 3.4.
13This algorithm is referred to as GreedyUp-LS in Shioura [2017].
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Proposition 3.4 (Shioura 2017, Theorem 4.16). Let S0 and S′0 be minimal steepest des-
cent directions at p and p + eS0 , respectively. Then we have
1. g′(p + eS0 ;S′0) > g′(p;S0) or
2. g′(p + eS0 ;S′0) = g′(p;S0) and S0 ⊆ S′0.
Lemma 3.5. Let S0 denote the minimal steepest descent at p and let λ(p, S0) be defined as in
(6). Then eS0 is the minimal steepest descent at p + (λ− 1)eS0 for any 1 ≤ λ ≤ λ(p, S0).
Shioura [2017] bounds the number of iterations of LongStepMinUp as follows.
Theorem 3.6 (Shioura 2017, Theorem 4.17). The number of iterations of LongStepMinUp
is at most nmax{−g′(0;S) | S ⊆ [n]}.
Note that 0 and eS0 share a demanded bundle x, so for any S ⊆ [n] we have
g′(0;S) = g(eS)− g(0) = fu(eS) + t.eS − fu(0) = (t− x).eS ≥ −
∑
i∈[n]
xi ≥ −|B|,
as each bid contributes at most one unit to the demanded bundle. This implies that
LongStepMinUp takes at most n|B| iterations to find component-wise minimal equilibrium
prices.
3.1.1 Computing the step length
Fix a price p and let eS0 be the component-wise minimal steepest descent direction at p. We
describe two methods to compute the step length defined by (6). The first method uses binary
search and is also suggested in Shioura [2017], while second method exploits our knowledge
of the bids to determine λ(p;S0). Note that we can evaluate g′(p;S0) in time O(n|B|), as
g′(p;S0) = g(p + eS0)− g(p).
Theorem 3.7. The LongStepMinUp algorithm in combination with the binary search and
demand change methods has a respective running time of O(n2|B|2 logM + n|B|T (n)) and
O(n2|B|3 + n|B|T (n)).
A description of the two methods, as well as a proof of this theorem, is provided below. Note
that as the two methods have different running time guarantees, the best method in practice is
context-specific.
Binary search Note that λ(p;S0) can be bounded by the total number of unit steps inMinUp,
which in turn is bounded by M . By Proposition 3.4, we have that g′(p;S0) < g′(p + λeS0 ;S0)
implies g′(p;S0) < g′(p + λ′eS0 ;S0) for all λ′ > λ. Hence we can apply binary search to find
λ(p;S0) in time O(n|B| logM).
Demand change Alternatively, we can exploit our knowledge of the individual bids to de-
termine λ(p;S0). We proceed by performing a demand-change procedure, which repeatedly
determines the highest value µ for which every bid b ∈ B demands the same goods (or a super-
set thereof) at prices p + µeS0 that it demands at p + eS0 and updates p to p + µeS0 .
Fix a bid b and let I denote the goods it demands at p. If I 6⊆ S0, then b demands the same
set of goods Ib = I \ S0 at all prices p+ µ′eS0 with µ′ ≥ 1. On the other hand, suppose I ⊆ S0.
We define µb := minj 6∈S0((bi − pi) − (bj − pj)), where i is any good in I, and consider the set
of goods that b demands at prices p + µ′eS0 with µ′ ≥ 1. If 1 ≤ µ′ < µb, then b demands I, if
µ′ = µb then b demands a superset of I and if µ′ > µb, then b demands none of the goods in I.
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We define C to be the set of bids that demand a subset of S0 at p, and let µ(p, S0) := minb∈C µb.
Note that we can determine the value of µ(p, S0) in time O(n|B|).
The demand-change procedure takes as input a price p0 := p and direction eS0 , and consists
of the following steps. Initially, we set λ to 0. Compute µ(p, S0), and increment λ by µ(p, S0).
If we have λ = λ(p0, S0), return λ. Otherwise, increment p by µeS0 and repeat the above with
the same value for eS0 .
Note that in order to check whether λ = λ(p0;S0), we can compute g′(p0 + µeS0 ;S0) and
verify that g′(p0 + µeS0 ;S0) = g′(0;S0), which takes time O(n|B|). Lemma 3.8 proves that the
demand-change procedure correctly computes the value of λ(p;S0) in time O(n|B|2).
Lemma 3.8. The demand-change procedure returns λ(p;S0) in at most |B| iterations.
Proof. Let K denote the number of iterations in the demand-change procedure and let pk, µk
and Ck be the values of p, µ(p, S0) and C after the k-th iteration. For notational convenience,
let p0 = p and µ0 = 0.
Proposition 3.4 implies that it suffices to show
g′(p;S0) = g′(pK − eS ;S0) and g′(p;S0) < g′(pK ;S0) (7)
in order to prove the first claim that λ = λ(p, S0).
Firstly, note that there is a bundle x that is demanded at pk−1 and pk, as well as all prices
in between these two points. Indeed, if a bid b demands good i at pk−1 + eS0 , then b also
demands i at the two prices pk−1 and pk − eS0 = pk−1 + (µk − 1)eS0 , by construction of µk.
Hence, making use of (2), we get
g′(pk−1;S0) = (t− x).eS0 = g′(pk − eS0 ;S0).
Secondly, note that for every 0 ≤ k < K, we have g′(pk − eS0 ;S0) = g′(pk;S0), and for the last
iteration K we have g′(pK − eS0 ;S0) < g′(pK ;S0). This implies (7).
Now we turn to the second claim, that K ≤ |B|. This follows from the fact that Ck−1 ) Ck
and |C0| ≤ |B|. Indeed, if b 6∈ Ck−1, then b demands goods I 6⊆ S0 at pk−1 and Ib = I \S0 at any
prices pk−1+µeS0 for any µ ≥ 1, so b 6∈ Ck. Now suppose b ∈ Ck−1 is a bid for which µk−1 = µb
(at pk−1). Then we claim that b 6∈ Ck. Indeed, the demanded goods I ′ of b at p + (µb + 1)eS0
satisfy I ′ 6⊆ S0 by construction of µb. By the same argument as above, b demands goods not in
S0 at all prices p + µeS0 with µ ≥ µb + 1.
3.2 Some practical improvements
The computation time of MinUp and LongStepMinUp is dominated by the task of finding a
minimal set S0 minimising g′(p;S) using SFM. In practice, we can exploit our direct access to
the bids to speed up the computation of S0 by decreasing the dimensionality of the submodular
function to be minimised. The following observations can be seen as a special case of observations
by Ausubel [2006]. Fix p ∈ Zn+ and let eS0 be the minimal steepest descent direction at p. Note
that p and p + eS0 share a demanded bundle x due to the structure of our price space. Hence
g′(p;S0) = g(p + eS0)− g(p) = (t− x)eS0 ,
and S0 minimises this term if and only if S0 contains all indices i ∈ [n] with ti < xi and no
indices j ∈ [n] with tj > xj . In particular, we have S0 := {i ∈ [n] | ti < xi} due to the minimal
minimiser property of S0.
If p has a unique demanded bundle x, which is easy to verify, it is straightforward to
compute x. Hence, in this case we can determine the minimal steepest descent direction eS0
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without performing SFM. In the case that p has at least two demanded bundles, the demanded
bundle x shared by p and p + eS0 is unknown. However, if we define index sets Ip and Jp as
Ip := {i ∈ [n] | xi > ti,∀x ∈ D(p)},
Jp := {i ∈ [n] | xi ≤ ti,∀x ∈ D(p)},
we have Ip ⊆ S0 and Jp∩S0 = ∅. Hence we can restrict ourselves to minimising the submodular
function h : [n] \ (Ip ∪ Jp)→ Z defined by h(T ) = g′(p;T ∪ Ip) and reduce the dimensionality of
the SFM problem from n to n − |Ip ∪ Jp|. The following lemma shows that computing Ip and
Jp is cheap.
Lemma 3.9. Ip and Jp can be computed in time O(n|B|).
Proof. Note that Ip = {i ∈ [n] | minx∈D(p) xi > ti} and Jp = {i ∈ [n] | maxx∈D(p) xi ≤ ti},
where we compute the minimum and maximum component-wise. Fix i ∈ [n]. The minimum
minx∈D(p) xi is attained if no marginal bid selects good i. Hence
minxi =
∑
{w(b) | b ∈ B is non-marginal and demands i}.
Similarly, we claim that maxx∈D(p) xi is attained if good i is selected whenever possible and
thus maxx∈D(p) xi is the sum of the weights of the bids for which i is demanded. Consider
the price perturbation p′ defined by p′i = pi and p
′
j = pj + ε for j 6= i. Here ε > 0 is chosen
sufficiently small so that every bid that is marginal on i at p is non-marginal and demands i at
p′, while every non-marginal bid demanding good i at p is also non-marginal and demands i at
p′. This perturbation corresponds to our proposed rule to compute maxxi by selecting good i
whenever possible.
Note that all bundles x′ at price p′ have the same number of items of i and are also demanded
at p. As p ≤ p′ and pi = p′i, the strong substitutes property implies that there exists x′ ∈ D(p′)
such that xi ≤ x′i for all x ∈ D(p). In other words, any demanded bundle x′ at p′ maximises xi.
4 Allocations to the separate bidders
Suppose we are given a market-clearing price p for target bundle t. We now present an algorithm
that solves the allocation problem, i.e. finds a partition (tj)j∈J of the target bundle t such that
tj is demanded by bidder j at price p. We note that while the market-clearing price p returned
by LongStepMinUp in Section 3 is minimal, our allocation algorithm works for any integral
market-clearing price.
Our algorithm repeatedly simplifies the problem until it becomes vacuous. We generate a
sequence of allocation problems by iteratively allocating parts of the target bundle to bidders
and removing the corresponding bids from the bid lists until the residual target bundle is empty.
If there are non-marginal bids or the allocation of items is unambiguous in some other way, a
new allocation problem is obtained by removing the relevant items and their corresponding bids
from the residual supply and bid lists. This is performed by Procedures 1 and 2, respectively,
and constitutes an obvious measure of improvement. Otherwise a shift-project-unshift opera-
tion, performed by Procedure 3, simplifies the allocation problem by reducing the number of
solutions to the allocation problem.
In order to describe our algorithm, we introduce the weaker notion of local validity for bid
lists. This is used to define a generalised version of the allocation problem (see Definition 4.3),
which also features a partial allocation bundle for each bidder as well as a residual target bundle.
With each allocation problem we associate a corresponding marginal bids multigraph that we
use to quantify our progress and establish the running time of the algorithm. Additionally, we
introduce the derived graph as a tool to compute the parameters required for Procedures 2
and 3.
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4.1 The generalised allocation problem
After allocating parts of the target bundle and deleting the corresponding bids, the bidders’
bid lists may no longer be valid in the sense of Theorem 2.3. (Figure 4 gives an example of
this.) Instead, we introduce the notion of local validity that only requires bid lists to be valid in
the neighbourhood of the market-clearing price p. For prices p in this neighbourhood, we can
define the demand correspondence DB(p) in the same way as for globally valid bid lists. Let
B(p, ε) := {y ∈ Rn | ‖y − p‖∞ < ε} denote the open ball with regard to the L∞-norm.
Definition 4.1. We say that a set of bids B is (locally) valid at p if there exists an open, convex
neighbourhood P of p that satisfies the following equivalent criteria.
1. The indirect utility function fB restricted to P is convex.
2. There is no price vector p ∈ P and pair of goods i, i′ ∈ [n]0 at which the weights of the
bids marginal on i and i′ sum to a negative number.
For a set of bids B that is valid at p, define DB(p) to be the discrete convex hull of bundles
demanded at UDRs adjacent to p. If P = B(p, ε) for some ε > 0, we say that B is ε-valid at p.
Proposition 4.2. The two criteria in Definition 4.1 are equivalent.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Definition 4.3. An allocation problem is a 5-tuple A = [p, (Bj)j∈J , w, (mj)j∈J , r], where
1. p ∈ Rn+1 is a price vector with p0 = 0,
2. for each bidder j ∈ J , Bj is a list of bids in {0} × (Z+ {0, 110})n that is locally valid at p,
3. the weight function w specifies the weights of all bids,
4. mj ∈ Zn+1+ for each j ∈ J is the partial allocation,
5. r ∈ Zn+1+ is the residual supply,
and there exists a valid allocation (rj)j∈J of the residual supply r to bidders, i.e. rj ∈ DBj (p)
and
∑
j∈J r
j = r. For any such valid allocation, we say that tj := rj + mj is a solution to A.
Note that the bids need not be integral and the bid lists for the bidders are only required to
be locally valid at p. The intuition behind this definition is to capture the action of successively
allocating items of the target bundle t to bidders. While these allocations may break global
validity, they preserve local validity at p. For each bidder j ∈ J , the partial allocation mj is a
bundle denoting the fraction of t already allocated to j, while r denotes the remaining part of t
not yet allocated to any bidder. The 0-th coordinates of mj and r denote the number of reject
goods (not yet) allocated.
Definition 4.4. We say that A′ is a valid reduction from A if A′ is an allocation problem and
all solutions to A′ are also solutions to A.
In the initial problem, the residual supply is given by the target bundle and the partial
allocation vectors are 0. Note that t0 denotes the total number of rejected bids and can be
computed as the total weight of bids minus the total number of items in t. In the vacuous
problem, the bid lists are empty and the residual supply is 0.
Next we define the surplus gap of a bid b at p as the difference between the utility derived
from a demanded good and the maximum utility derived from a non-demanded good. This
allows us to describe the goods that b demands when we perturb the price or the bid by a small
amount. Moreover, we see in Lemma 4.7 that the size of the neighbourhood around p in which
a bid list is valid can be lower bounded by the surplus gaps of the bids in B.
Formally, let I = arg maxi∈[n]0 bi−pi denote the goods demanded by b at p. Then if I 6= [n]0,
we define the surplus gap of b at p as
max
i∈[n]0
(bi − pi)−max
i 6∈I
(bi − pi).
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Observation 4.5. Suppose bid b demands goods I at p with a surplus gap of at least ε. Then
for any price p′ ∈ B(p, ε/2), the goods I ′ demanded by b at p′ form a subset of I.
Observation 4.6. Suppose bid b demands goods I at p with a surplus gap of at least ε. Then
for any bid b′ ∈ B(p, ε/4) and price p′ ∈ B(p, ε/4), the goods I ′ demanded by b at p′ form a
subset of I.
Lemma 4.7. If B is locally δ-valid at p for some δ > 0 and all bids in B have a surplus gap of
at least ε at p, then B is locally ε/2-valid at p.
Proof. We show that fB is convex on B(p, ε/2) by verifying that it satisfies midpoint convexity.
Note that fB is linear on the line segment connecting p to q, for any q ∈ B(p, ε/2). Indeed, fB
is the sum of terms w(b) maxi∈[n]0 bi − pi and it suffices to show that each term is linear. Hence
fix b and define h(p) = w(b) maxi∈[n]0 bi − pi as well as r = θp+ (1− θ)q. By Observation 4.5,
the goods demanded by b at q, r and p satisfy Iq ⊆ Ir ⊆ Ip. Hence, for any i∗ ∈ Iq, we have
h(p) = w(b)(bi∗ − pi∗) = θh(p) + (1− θ)h(q).
Fix q, q′ ∈ B(p, ε/2) and choose θ > 0 so that r = θp + (1 − θ)q, r′ = θp + (1 − θ)q′ and
(r + r′)/2 are in B(p, δ). As fB is convex on B(p, δ), by assumption, we have
f
(
1
2
(r + r′)
)
≤ 1
2
f(r) +
1
2
f(r′).
Secondly, we have f(r) = θf(p) + (1− θ)f(q), f(r′) = θf(p) + (1− θ)f(q′) and f(12(r + r′)) =
θf(p) + (1− θ)f(12(q + q′)) due to the linearity of fB on the line segments connecting p to q, q′
and (q + q′)/2 . This implies midpoint convexity,
f
(
1
2
(q + q′)
)
≤ 1
2
f(q) +
1
2
f(q′).
4.2 The marginal bids graph and the derived graph
With every allocation problem A, we associate a marginal bids multigraph and a derived graph.
The marginal bids multigraph allows us to argue about the running time of our allocation
algorithm, while the derived graph plays an important role in deciding whether to apply Pro-
cedure 2 or 3, and to determine the input parameters for these procedures.
Definition 4.8. The marginal bids graph GA associated with allocation problem A is an un-
directed edge-labelled multigraph whose vertices are the goods [n]0 (including the ‘reject’ good).
GA has an edge (i, i′) labelled with j if bidder j has a bid that is marginal at p between i and i′.
A vertex is a link good if its incident edges are labelled with more than one bidder. Note
that for any bidder j, the subgraph induced by all j-labelled edges is a simple graph, i.e. there is
at most one edge labelled j connecting two goods i and i′. A pair (I, j) with I ⊆ [n]0 and j ∈ J
is a key list if I is the set of vertices of some connected component of the subgraph induced by
the j-labelled edges. We call a cycle in GA a multi-bidder cycle if it contains edges labelled by
different bidders. A vertex in such a cycle is called a cycle-link good if its two edges in the cycle
are labelled differently. Note that any multi-bidder cycle has at least two cycle-link goods.
Definition 4.9. The derived graph DA associated with allocation problem A is a simple bipart-
ite graph whose two disjoint and independent vertex sets are the set of link goods and the set of
key lists of GA. There is an edge between link good i and key list (I, j) if we have i ∈ I.
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(a) A marginal bids multigraph.
6 {1, 5, 6}, A 1 {1, 2}, C
{5, 6}, C 5 {1, 2, 5}, B 2 {2, 3, 4}, A
(b) A derived graph.
Figure 3: Example of a marginal bids multigraph (a) and derived graph (b) with three bidders A,B,C
and six goods 1, . . . , 6. Goods 1, 2, 5, 6 are link goods. Goods 2, 3, 4 form a key list ({2, 3, 4}, A) with one
link good, represented by a leaf key list in the derived graph (bolded in both graphs).
Note that by the definition of link goods, every link good is adjacent to at least two key
lists in the derived graph. Figure 3 gives an example of a marginal bids multigraph and its
corresponding derived graph.
We describe a procedure to construct the derived graph in near-linear time O(α(n)n|B|)
using a disjoint-union data structure. Here α(·) is the inverse Ackermann function, which grows
extremely slowly and is near-constant in our context, as α(n) ≤ 4 for any n ≤ 2222
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. The
disjoint-union data structure (cf. Tarjan and van Leeuwen [1984]) maintains a representation of
a set partition and admits a α(n)-time operation to merge two subsets of the partition. Internally,
it assigns a distinct label to each subset of the partition and provides α(n)-time access to the
label of the subset in which a given element lies.
First we show how to compute the key lists for each bidder. Fix a bidder j and initialise the
disjoint-union data structure. For each bid b ∈ Bj , compute the marginal goods S at prices p
and, fixing any i ∈ S, merge the sets containing i and i′ for all i′ ∈ S \ {i}. Now the data
structure has learnt the vertex partition induced by the connected components of GA in time
O(α(n)n|Bj |).
In order to recover this partition and express it as a family of sets, we initialise an empty
‘labelled’ family K of sets: each set in K will have an associated label. For each good in i ∈ [n],
determine the label l of i’s subset in the data structure. If there already is a set in K with label
l, add i to this set. Otherwise, add the new singleton set {i} with label l to K. Finally, iterate
through K and delete all singleton sets. This takes time O(α(n)n). Now K represents the family
of key lists of bidder j. Hence in total it takes time O(α(n)n|B|) to compute the key lists for all
bidders.
In order to compute the link goods, iterate through the key lists of all bidders and count the
number of times each good appears. If a good appears at least twice, it is a link good. Once we
know which good is a link good, we can compute the edges of the derived graph: for each key
list (I, j), add an edge between (I, j) and each link good in I. Iterating through the key lists of
all bidders takes O(nm) = O(n|B|) time.
The following subroutine FindParams takes as input an allocation problem and returns
one of three possible outputs: a key list (I, j) with no link goods, a key list (I, j) with one link
good i∗, or a cycle-link good i∗ and the label j∗ of one of its incident edges in the multi-bidder
cycle. The subroutine is used both to decide whether to invoke Procedure 2 or 3, and to
compute the input for the respective procedure.
FindParams
Step 1 Compute the derived graph DA.
Step 2 If DA has an isolated key list vertex, return this key list (without a link good).
Otherwise, starting from any link good, find a maximal path that alternates between
link good and key list vertices (without revisiting edges).
Step 3 Let i∗ and (I, j∗) be the last link good and key list visited, respectively. If the path is
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open, return (I, j∗) and i∗. If the path is closed, return i∗ and j∗.
Lemma 4.10. In time O(α(n)n|B|), FindParams returns a key list (I, j∗) with no link goods,
a key list (I, j∗) with one link good i∗, or a cycle-link good i∗ and the label j∗ of one of its
incident edges in the multi-bidder cycle.
Proof. By construction of the derived graph, an isolated key list in DA contains no link goods,
while a leaf key list contains exactly one link good. Hence if there is an isolated key list, the
subroutine returns a key list without a link good. If the path found is open, the last vertex must
be a leaf key list and the subroutine returns a key list with single link good.
Now suppose the path is closed and consider only the cycle formed by alternating link good
and key list vertices. Firstly, note that there is a path between consecutive link goods in the
marginal bids graph GA using only j-labelled edges. Secondly, consecutive key lists have different
bidder labels. These two observations imply that GA contains a simple multi-bidder cycle with
cycle-link good i∗ and an incident edge labelled with j∗.
Note that the path has length at most 2n by the pigeonhole principle. Hence constructing
the derived graph, which takes time O(α(n)n|B|), dominates the running time.
4.3 Allocating unambiguous bids
Non-marginal bids Suppose bidder j has a non-marginal bid b at market-clearing prices
p that demands good i ∈ [n]0 in the allocation problem A. Then this bid contributes exactly
w(b) ∈ {−1, 1} items of good i to any solution of A. Hence we can unambiguously allocate these
items to mj and remove them from the residual supply r, thus accepting the non-marginal bid
on the appropriate good. Procedure 1 below processes all non-marginal bids in this way. Note
that while this operation may not preserve global validity of bid lists, the resulting lists remain
locally valid at p, so that the result is a valid allocation problem. Figure 4 gives an example.
Procedure 1 (accept non-marginal bids)
Input Allocation problem A = [p, (Bj)j∈J , w, (mj)j∈J , r].
Output Reduced allocation problem A′ without non-marginal bids.
For every bidder j ∈ J and each non-marginal bid b ∈ Bj that demands good i:
Remove b from Bj ,
Increment mji by w(b),
Decrement ri by w(b).
Lemma 4.11. Given a valid allocation problem A, Procedure 1 outputs a reduction A′ of A
in linear time. Moreover, we have GA = GA′.
Proof. Let A′ = [p, (Bj)′j∈J , w, (mj)′j∈J , r′] be the output of Procedure 1. First we show
that A′ is a valid allocation problem. Fix some j ∈ J . Since Bj is locally valid by assumption,
the indirect utility function fBj is convex in some small neighbourhood of p. Allocating a non-
marginal bid to bidder j corresponds to subtracting from the utility function fBj (q) the term
maxi∈[n]0(bi− qi). In a sufficiently small neighbourhood of p, this term is linear, so the resulting
utility function is also convex in some open neighbourhood of p.
It is straightforward to see that (tj)j∈J is a solution to A′ if and only if it is a solution to A,
so A′ is a reduction of A. To see that GA = GA′ , note that the marginal bids are unchanged.
Unambiguous marginal bids Let A be a valid allocation problem without non-marginal
bids and let (I, j) be a key list. By the definition of a key list, none of bidder j’s bids are
marginal between items in both I and [n]0 \ I. Let BjI denote the bids marginal on goods in I.
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p1
p2
2 4 6
2
4
6
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(a) Alice’s bid list after Procedure 1.
p1
p2
2 4 6
2
4
6
(−
1,
1)
(0, 0) (−1, 0) (0, 0)
(b) Bob’s bid list after Procedure 1.
Figure 4: The resulting bid lists after applying Procedure 1 to Alice’s and Bob’s bid lists from
Figure 1 at prices p = (6, 4) (marked by a cross). Note that Alice’s bid list remains globally valid,
whereas Bob’s bid list is only locally 2-valid at p (indicated by the hatched square).
Hence all bids b ∈ BjI contribute an item of a good in I to bidder j’s allocation bundle (in any
valid allocation), while all other bids contribute an item of a good not in I.
If the key list (I, j) has no link goods, none of the bids by bidders other than j are marginal
on I, so all items of goods i ∈ I in the residual supply must be allocated to j. Hence we can
reduce our allocation problem by transferring ri items from the residual supply r to bidder j’s
partial allocation bundle mj and removing all bids from Bj that are marginal on items in I.
If the key list (I, j) has a single link good i∗, all items of goods in I \ {i∗} must be allocated
to j by the same argument as above. Secondly, the bids in Bj marginal on goods in I must be
allocated a total of
∑
b∈BjI w(b) units of goods in I. The difference∑
b∈BjI
w(b)−
∑
i∈I\{i∗}
ri
gives us the number of items of i∗ that must be allocated to j and we can reduce our allocation
problem as above and stated in Procedure 2.
Procedure 2 (process unambiguous marginal bids)
Input Allocation problem A = [p, (Bj)j∈J , w, (mj)j∈J , r],
key list (I, j) with at most one link good i∗.
Output Valid reduction A′ of A with no marginal bids on I.
If (I, j) has no link goods:
For each i ∈ I, increment mji by ri and set ri to 0.
Otherwise (if (I, j) has link good i∗):
Compute d =
∑
b∈BjI w(b)−
∑
i∈I\{i∗} ri.
Increment mji∗ by d and decrement ri∗ by d.
For each i ∈ I \ {i∗}, increment mji by ri and set ri to 0.
Step 2 Remove all bids marginal on I from Bj .
Lemma 4.12. Procedure 2 returns a valid reduction of the input allocation problem in time
O(n|Bj |). Moreover, the marginal bids graph GA′ of A′ has strictly fewer edges than GA.
Proof. In order to see that A′ is a valid allocation problem, we verify that the new bid list (Bj)′ of
bidder j after applying Procedure 2 is locally valid by checking criterion (2) of Definition 4.1.
Fix a price p and goods i, i′. Recall that bids in Bj cannot be marginal on goods in I and
[n]0 \ I, by the definition of key lists. If i ∈ I and i′ 6∈ I, then Bj has no bids marginal on i
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and i′. If both i, i′ are goods in I, all bids marginal on i and i′ are removed by Procedure 2.
If neither i nor i′ is a good in I, then none of the bids marginal on i and i′ are removed. As Bj
is locally valid by assumption, this implies that (Bj)′ is also locally valid.
It is straightforward to see that a solution to A′ is a solution to A, as the partial allocation
performed by Procedure 2 is unambiguous. Finally, let i, i′ ∈ I and note that the marginal
bids graph GA contains an edge between i and i′ that is not present in GA′ . As removing bids
does not introduce new edges to the graph, GA′ has strictly fewer edges.
4.4 The shift-project-unshift reduction
Shifting bids Suppose all bids are integral and we shift some bidder’s bids by a small quantity
ε < 1/4 (we use ε = 1/10 for concreteness) in the direction of i by adding εei to each bid vector.
Then Lemma 4.13 and Proposition 4.14 together show that we can use SFM to find a price
pε ∈ {p + εeS , S ⊆ [n]}, at which the new allocation problem A′ with shifted bids and price
vector pε is a valid reduction.
Lemma 4.13. Fix ε with |ε| < 1/4 and j ∈ J . Let A be an allocation problem with integral bids
and prices, and let A′ be obtained by replacing Bj with (Bj)′ := {b + εei | b ∈ Bj}. Then the
bid lists of all bidders in A′ are locally valid at any price pε ∈ B(p, ε). Moreover, the bundles
demanded by any bidder at pε in A′ form a subset of the bundles they demand at p in A.
Proof. As the bids and prices in A are integral, each bid either demands all goods [n]0 or has a
surplus gap of at least 1 at p. By Lemma 4.7, all bid lists are 1/2-valid at p. This implies that
every unshifted bid list is (1/2− ε)-valid at pε and the shifted bid list is (1/2− 2ε)-valid at pε.
By Observations 4.5 and 4.6, a non-marginal bid demands the same good for all q ∈ B(pε, δ)
and sufficiently small δ > 0. Hence a bidder will demand the same set of bundles at all non-
marginal prices in B(pε, δ). As the bundles a bidder demands at pε are by definition the discrete
convex hull of bundles they demand at non-marginal prices infinitesimally close to pε, we are
done.
Proposition 4.14. Let A be an allocation problem with price vector p and fix ε with |ε| < 1/4.
If we shift bidder j’s bids by ε, there exists a price pε ∈ {p± εeS , S ⊆ [n]}, at which the residual
supply r is demanded. We can determine pε using submodular minimisation of the Lyapunov
function g with regard to the aggregate bid list and the residual supply r.
The proof of Proposition 4.14 is given in Appendix B.
Projecting bids Next we define a projection operation on bids. The idea of this operation is
to modify a bid b so that its surplus gap at p is increased. As a consequence, if that bid or the
price is perturbed slightly, it “remembers” its preferred goods.
Let b be a bid and I = arg maxi∈[n]0 bi − pi be the set of demanded goods at price p. The
projection b′ of b w.r.t. p is defined as follows.
b′ :=
{
b− e[n]0\I if 0 ∈ I,
b + eI otherwise.
Note that we allow for bid vector entries to be negative. Figure 5 illustrates the projection
operation.
Observation 4.15. If bid b demands all goods [n]0, we have b′ = b. Otherwise, the projection
operation on b w.r.t. p increases the bid’s surplus gap at p by 1.
Lemma 4.16. Projecting all bids in a bidder’s bid list B w.r.t. p does not change the set of
bundles demanded at p. Moreover, if B is locally valid at p, the projected bid list is locally
1/2-valid.
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(a) Five numbered bids before projecting.
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(b) The result of projecting w.r.t. prices p = (4, 4).
Figure 5: Example of the project operation w.r.t. prices p = (4, 4) on five bids numbered from 1 to 5
shown in (a). The projected bids are shown in (b). Note that only the negative bid is unchanged, as it
demands all goods, including the reject good.
Proof. Suppose all bids in B have a surplus gap of at least ε at p and B is locally δ-valid at p.
Note that at any price q in the open ball B(p, ε) centred at p, every bid demands the same set
of goods before and after projecting. Hence the projected bid list is locally min{δ, ε}-valid at p,
and the set of bundles demanded at p, consisting of the discrete convex hull of bundles demanded
in UDRs bordering p remains the same. The second statement follows from Observations 4.7
and 4.15.
Now we are ready to state the final procedure, which combines shifting and projecting to
reduce the number of solutions of a given allocation problem.
Procedure 3 (shift-project-unshift)
Input Allocation problem A = [p, (Bj)j∈J , w, (mj)j∈J , r],
cycle-link good i∗ and edge label j∗.
Output Allocation problem A′.
Step 1 Add 110e
i∗ to each of j∗’s bids and compute a new market-clearing price pε = p+ 110e
S∗
by solving S∗ = arg minS⊆[n] gr(p± 110eS) using SFM.
Step 2 Project every bid set w.r.t. pε.
Step 3 Subtract 110e
i∗ from each of j∗’s bids and reset price to p.
The following analysis of Procedure 3 holds.
Lemma 4.17. The marginal bids graph GA′ of A′ has strictly fewer edges than GA.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.18. Procedure 3 returns a reduction A′ of A in time O(T (n) +n|B|), where T (n)
is the time it takes to minimise an n-dimensional submodular set function.
Proof. For convenience, let Ai denote the allocation problem obtained after Step i. First we
show that A1 is a reduction of A. Indeed, by Proposition 4.14 and Step 1, the residual bundle
r is aggregately demanded at pε in A1. Furthermore, for any allocation (rj)j∈J = (tj −mj)j∈J
of the residual bundle r at price pε in A1, Lemma 4.13 implies that (mj + rj)j∈J is a solution
of A.
Lemma 4.16 implies that A2 is a reduction of A1.
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Finally, after Step 3, the bid lists are locally valid at p by Lemma 4.13. Proposition 4.14
implies that the residual bundle r is demanded at some price p′ ∈ {pε ± εeS | S ⊆ [n]}. Note
that if a bundle is demanded at p′, it is also demanded at [p′] due to the structure of our integral
bid vectors, where [·] denotes the operation of rounding each component to the nearest integer.
As [p′] = p, the result follows.
4.5 The allocation algorithm
The algorithm Allocate stated below combines Procedures 1, 2 and 3 in order to solve
the allocation problem described in Section 2.4. We use FindParams as a subroutine to decide
whether to call Procedure 2 or 3 in each iteration of the loop. Theorem 4.19 proves correctness
and gives a running time bound of Allocate. We note that this bound is likely to be pessimistic.
Allocate
Input Initial allocation problem A.
Output Target bundle allocation.
Step 1 Allocate all non-marginal bids with Procedure 1. If there are no more bids, return
the partial allocation bundle mj for each bidder j ∈ J .
Step 2 Run the FindParams subroutine.
If it returns a key list (I, j∗) with at most one link good i∗, apply Procedure 2.
Otherwise (if it returns a cycle-link good i∗ and edge label j∗), apply Procedure 3.
Go to Step 1.
Theorem 4.19. Allocate solves the allocation problem in time O
(
n2|J |(α(n)n|B|+ T (n))),
where T (n) is the time required to minimise an n-dimensional submodular set function.
Proof. By construction, the marginal bids graph of the initial allocation problem has at most
|J |(n+12 ) edges. Every call to Procedure 2 or 3 strictly reduces the number of edges (by
Lemmas 4.12 and 4.17). Hence after at most |J |(n+12 ) iterations of Step 2, the marginal bids
graph of the current allocation problem is an empty graph, implying that there are no more
marginal bids. In particular, at this point a single call to Procedure 1 allocates all remaining
non-marginal bids and returns a vacuous allocation problem. As all three procedures return a
reduction in the sense of Definition 4.4, the solution to the final vacuous allocation problem is
also a solution to the original allocation problem.
To see the running time guarantee, note that FindParams and Procedures 1,2 and 3 are
each called at most |J |(n+12 ) = O(n2|J |) times, and FindParams dominates Procedures 1
and 2.
Incorporating priorities The FindParams subroutine as stated in Section 4.2 is not fully
specified, and different implementations may lead to different inputs for Procedure 2 or 3
when given the same allocation problem. If the input for Procedure 3 depends on the imple-
mentation used, ties may be broken differently and thus the target bundle is allocated differently
among the bidders.
In order to control which input for Procedure 3 is returned, we propose the use of a
priority list consisting of a permutation of all good-bidder pairs (i, j) ∈ [n]0 × J .14 This list
may be given as an additional input parameter at the start of Allocate or be generated
and updated dynamically as Allocate runs. The subroutine FindParams is replaced by
PriorityParams, which returns the highest pair (i, j) in the priority list that constitutes a
valid input to Procedure 3, or an input to Procedure 2 if no such pair exists. Recall that a
14The priority list can be chosen to favor certain types of bidder; for example, if it is considered desirable to
bring “small” bidders (having low demand) into the market, we can prioritise their bids, making it slightly more
likely that they will be allocated.
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pair (i, j) is a valid input for Procedure 3 if i is a cycle-link good in some multi-bidder cycle
and j is the label of one of its edges in this cycle. This is the case if the derived graph DA has
a cycle containing the edge from i to the key list (I, j) satisfying i ∈ I. For any (undirected)
graph G and edge vw, one can check whether G has a cycle containing e by determining whether
its endpoints v and w are connected in the graph G− e obtained by deleting vw using breadth
first search (BFS). This implies the following subroutine.
PriorityParams
Step 1 Compute the derived graph DA.
Step 2 For each pair (i, j) in the priority list:
If i is a link good and i ∈ I for some key list (I, j), check whether the edge from i to (I, j)
lies in a cycle by temporarily removing the edge and checking (using BFS) whether the
two endpoints are still connected in the graph.
Return (i, j) if the edge lies in a cycle.
Step 3 Return some leaf key list (I, j) and the adjacent link good i.
To see that PriorityParams is well-defined, note that the priority list is a permutation of
all possible pairs (i, j). Hence if the derived graph contains a cycle, the subroutine will return
it, otherwise there exist at least two leaves for Step 2 to choose from. In practice, we can prune
the priority list dynamically by removing pairs (i, j) once i is no longer a link good. This is
possible because Procedures 2 and 3 do not add edges to the derived graph, and so a good
cannot become a link good again at some later point.
5 Conclusions and further work
This paper has provided a practical process for running auctions in which bidders can express
strong substitutes preferences using positive and negative bids. Previous work has shown [Bald-
win and Klemperer, 2019b] that all strong substitutes preferences can be represented using
appropriate combinations of these bids. Although the co-NP-completeness result we showed in
Section 2.3 indicates that, at least in high dimensions, some restrictions may be needed on the
allowed sets of bids, useful sub-classes of collections of bids are easily checkable for validity in
practice, and can be checked offline, bidder by bidder, prior to the auction.
Our use of the product-mix auction’s bidding language (by contrast with previous authors’
usage of an abstract oracle) facilitates computing allocations as well as prices. One question for
future research is whether we can also exploit the information provided by the bidding language
to improve the computational efficiency of the pre-existing submodular function minimisation
subroutine that both our price-finding and allocation algorithms use. Another obvious question
is the extent to which our methods can be extended to broader classes of valuations.
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A Experiments
In order to evaluate the practical running time of our allocation algorithm, we run experiments
on various numbers of goods, bidders and bids. We use our own Python implementation of the
product-mix auction that is available at http://github.com/edwinlock/product-mix. Some
effort was made to optimise for speed by exploiting fast matrix operations provided by the Numpy
package (cf. [van der Walt et al., 2011]). Furthermore, in an effort to implement submodular
minimisation efficiently, the Fujishige-Wolfe algorithm was implemented in combination with a
memoization technique to reduce the number of submodular function queries.
A.1 Generating test data
We describe a procedure to generate a valid list of positive and negative bids at points within the
lattice [M ]n and a bundle x that is demanded in aggregate by these bids at prices p = 12Me
[n]
in the centre of the lattice. In our experiments, we fix M = 100. The bids are generated in
such a way that for parameter q at least q bids are marginal between two or more goods at p
and we pick x such that p is the component-wise minimal market-clearing price vector. For any
permutation pi of [n], let ppi = p+
∑
i∈[n]
ε
2ie
pi(i) for some ε < 0.1. Note that a unique bundle is
demanded at ppi for any permutation pi.
GenerateList(n,M, q)
Initialise Empty bid list B and bundle x = 0.
Repeat q times:
Step 1 Pick a subset S of goods with |S| ≥ 2 from [n]0.
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With probability 1/2, pick a positive bid that is marginal on goods S at p and add it
to B. Pick any good i ∈ S uniformly at random and increment xi by one.
Otherwise, generate a negative bid b that is marginal on goods S at p, as well as the
following three positive bids. Pick two goods i, j ∈ [n] and add a bid at points b−λiei
and b − λjej for some 1 ≤ λi ≤ bi − 1 and 1 ≤ λj ≤ bj − 1. Finally, add a bid at
b+ λ1 for some 1 ≤ λ ≤ mini∈[n]M − bi. Pick a permutation pi of [n] and increment
x by the bundle aggregately demanded at ppi by the four bids just generated.
Step 2 If p is the component-wise minimal market-clearing price vector of x, return B. Other-
wise repeat the algorithm.
Generated in this way, every bid list has 2.5q bids in expectation. The procedure Gener-
ateList is repeated for each bidder, so the total number of bids generated is B = 2.5qm.
Lemma A.1. The bid list generated by GenerateList is valid.
Proof. Note that the union of finitely many valid bid lists is again a valid bid list. Hence it suffices
to show that the list consisting of one negative bid b and three positive bids b − λiei, b − λjej
and b + λ1 is valid. To see this, apply Theorem 2.3 together with Theorem C.9.
A.2 Testing the algorithm
We run Allocate on allocation problems with bid lists generated by GenerateList for dif-
ferent numbers of goods n, bidders m and bids B. It should be noted that, as expected, the
value of M has no discernable impact on the running time of the allocation algorithm and thus
can be fixed to M = 100. We perform three pairs of experiments in which we vary one of the
parameters n,m, q and fix the other two to realistic values.
1. For the first pair of experiments, we vary the average number of bids by running Gener-
ateList with values q = 20, 40, 60, . . . , 500. We fix the number of bidders to m = 5 and
the number of goods to n = 2 and n = 10, respectively.
2. For the second pair of experiments, we vary the number of goods from n = 10 to 50 in
steps of 5 and fix q to 50 and 100, respectively.
3. Finally, the last pair of experiments varies the number of bidders from m = 2 to m = 20
in steps of 1 with two goods n = 2, while the bid numbers are fixed by setting q to 50 and
100, respectively.
For each data point (n,m, q), 50 allocation problems with n goods, m bidders and 2.5q bids
per bidder (in expectation) are generated. The Allocate algorithm is then timed on each
allocation problem and the average over all 50 times is recorded.
A.3 Results
The outcomes of the three pairs of experiments are shown in Figures 6 to 8. The experimental
data corroborates the running time bounds forAllocate given in Theorem 4.19: the algorithms
is linear in the number of bids and quadratic in the number of goods. Figure 8 suggests that
our algorithm runs in quadratic time on our generated allocation problems, which is in line with
our theoretical bound, as the total number of bids B = 2.5qm is linear in m. Overall, we see
that our allocation algorithm runs quickly even when presented with a large number of bids.
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(a) Parameters: n = 2,m = 5,M = 100. (b) Parameters: n = 10,m = 5,M = 100.
Figure 6: Testing Allocate by varying the number B of bids for each bidder while keeping all other
parameters fixed. We increase q from 10 to 500 in steps of 10, fix the number of bidders at m = 5 and
set the number of goods to n = 2 (a) and n = 10 (b), respectively.
(a) Parameters: m = 5,M = 100, q = 50. (b) Parameters: m = 5,M = 100, q = 100.
Figure 7: Testing Allocate by varying the number n of goods. We increase n from 5 to 50 in steps
of 5, fix the number of bidders at m = 5 and M = 100 and set the number of bids to q = 50 (a) and
q = 100 (b), respectively.
(a) Parameters: n = 2,M = 100, q = 50. (b) Parameters: n = 2,M = 100, q = 100.
Figure 8: Testing Allocate by varying the number m of bidders. We increase m from 2 to 20 in steps
of 1, fix the number of goods at n = 2 and set q to 50 (a) and 100 (b), respectively.
B Additional proofs
We give some definitions that are used in the proofs below. Here and in the following, we use
terminology and material developed in Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a] and refer to the same
for details.
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Define the Locations of Indifference Prices (LIP) for a bid b as
Lb = {p ∈ Rn | | arg max
i∈[n]0
(bi − pi)| > 1}.
Similarly, the LIP of a list of bids B is given by
LB = {p ∈ Rn | |DB(p)| > 1}.
Any LB can be decomposed into an (n − 1)-dimensional rational polyhedral complex ΠB. We
call the (n − 1)-dimensional polyhedra in this complex its facets. Endow every facet F of ΠB
with a weight, as follows:
wB(F ) :=
∑
{w(b) | b ∈ B and Lb ⊇ F}.
Finally, we say that (ΠB, wB) is balanced if for every (n− 2)-cell G of Π, the weights w(Fj)
on the facets F1, . . . , Fl that contain G, and primitive integer normal vectors vFj for these facets
that are defined by a fixed rotational direction about G, satisfy
∑l
j=1w(Fj)vFj = 0.
Definition B.1 (cf. Baldwin and Klemperer 2019a, Definition 3.9). The strong substi-
tutes vectors are those non-zero vectors in Zn which have at most one +1 entry, at most one
−1 entry, and no other non-zero entries.
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.3. The equivalence of 1 and 2 follows from Proposition 4.2 if we set P = Rn.
The implication 3 ⇒ 1 is well-known; see for instance Murota and Shioura [2014, Theorem
7.3] for a stronger statement. We now show 2 ⇒ 3, using the Valuation-Complex Equivalence
Theorem from Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a]. Let (Π, wB) be the weighted polyhedral complex
associated with B. Note that as well as showing that balancing holds, we must also demonstrate
that all weights of the polyhedral complex are positive, which is the setting for Baldwin and
Klemperer [2019a]. Observe first that every facet of ΠB has a strong substitutes vector as its
normal vector, as this property holds for any individual Lb.
Note that the weighted polyhedral complex (Πb, wb) associated with a single bid is balanced.
If w(b) = 1 then this follows because (Πb, wb) is the weighted polyhedral complex associated
with a simple valuation for at most one unit of any good (and see [Baldwin and Klemperer,
2019a, Section 2.3]). This then extends to the case w(b) = −1 because changing the sign of
the weights of all facets does not affect balancing. Then (ΠB, wB) is also balanced, as it is the
complex corresponding to the union of balanced LIPs (see the proof of Lemma 3.13 in Baldwin
and Klemperer [2019a]).
Next we see that all weights of (ΠB, wB) are non-negative. Let F be a facet of ΠB and fix a
point p in the relative interior of F . Then, since the normal vector to F is a strong substitutes
vector (and by Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a, Proposition 2.4]), every bid is either non-marginal
at p or marginal between the same two distinct goods, i, i′ ∈ [n]0. Let Bii′ denote the bids that
are marginal between i, i′ at p. Note that we have F ⊆ Lb if and only if b is marginal on i, i′,
so wB(F ) =
∑
b∈Bii′ w(b) ≥ 0 (by assumption 2).
(ΠB, wB) may have zero-weighted facets: let the set of these be Π0B and write Π
+
B := ΠB \Π0B.
Then Π+B inherits from ΠB the structure of a polyhedral complex. Moreover, if we write w
+
B for
the restriction of wB to the facets of Π+B , then (Π
+
B , w
+
B ) is balanced: removing 0-weighted facets
does not affect this criterion.
So, we write L+B for the union of the cells in Π+B . Let p be a price vector whose components
are strictly larger than the components of any bid, so that DB(p) = 0. By the valuation-complex
equivalence theorem, there exists a unique concave valuation u such that Lu = L+B , wu = w+B ,
u(0) = 0 and Du(p) = 0.
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If w(b) is positive then Lb has the property that facets and weights define all changes
in demand between UDRs, [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2019a, Section 2.2], and it is easy to
see that the same follows for negative-weighted bids, and thus extends by aggregation to our
positive-weighted polyhedral complex (Π+B , w
+
B ). The same holds for Lu for standard reasons.
So Du(p) = DB(p) implies Du(p) = DB(p) for all UDR prices p ∈ Rn, and hence for all prices,
since u is concave and DB(p) is defined to be discrete convex.
We now show that fB = fu. For any bundle x, let p be a price at which x is demanded and
let (i(b))b∈B be a collection of goods allocated to the bids b ∈ B in order to obtain x. That is,
i(b) ∈ DB(p) for every b ∈ B and x =
∑
b∈B w(b)e
i(b). Then we claim that
u(x) =
∑
b∈B
w(b)bi(b). (8)
This then immediately implies fB(p) = fu(p) for any p ∈ Rn, as
fB(p) =
∑
b∈B
w(b) max
i∈[n]0
(bi − pi) =
∑
b∈B
w(b)(bi(b) − pi(b)) = u(x)− x.p = fu(p).
To see that (8) holds, let x′ and x′′ be bundles demanded in neighbouring UDRs and let p be
a price on the relative interior of the facet separating these UDRs. Moreover, let (i′(b))b∈B and
(i′′(b))b∈B be the allocation to bids at p that lead to bundles x′ and x′′. Then we have
u(x′)− p.x′ = u(x′′)− p.x′′ (9)
and
fB(p) =
∑
b∈B
w(b)(bi′(b) − pi′(b)) =
∑
b∈B
w(b)(bi′′(b) − pi′′(b)). (10)
Suppose (8) holds for bundle x′ and (i′(b))b∈B. Then (9) and (10) imply that (8) holds for x′′
and (i′′(b))b∈B. Finally, as u(0) = 0 = fB(0), this implies (8) for all possible bundles x, by
induction.
Finally, the strong substitutes property for u follows immediately from concavity of u and
our observation above that all facets of ΠB, and hence of Lu, are normal to a strong substitutes
vector [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2019a, Proposition 3.8].
Observation B.2. Let f : [0, 1] → R be a continuous, piecewise-linear function. If its slope is
non-decreasing as we move from 0 to 1, f is convex. This implies that if f is not convex, there
exists a point λ at which two linear segments meet and the slope decreases.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Recall that fB restricted to P is convex if and only if
fB(λp + (1− λ)q) ≤ λfB(p) + (1− λ)fB(q), ∀p, q ∈ P and λ ∈ [0, 1]. (11)
Suppose that p and q are two non-marginal prices in neighbouring UDRs such that for some
λ ∈ (0, 1), the point r = λp+ (1− λ)q lies on the interior of a facet separating the UDRs. This
implies two possibilities for each bid b ∈ B. Either b non-marginally demands the same good at
p and q (and thus also at r). Or b non-marginally demands i at p and i′ at q, and is marginal
(only) on i and i′ at r. Moreover, all bids of the latter kind are marginal on the same two goods.
Let Bii′ denote the bids that demand the set {i, i′} at r. We show that fB satisfies (11)
for p, q and any λ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if the weights of the bids marginal on i and i′ sum to a
non-negative number, i.e. if
∑
b∈B w(b) ≥ 0.
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By construction, we have
fB(p) =
∑
b∈Bii′
w(b)(bi − pi) +
∑
b6∈Bii′
w(b) max
j∈[n]0
(bj − pj),
fB(q) =
∑
b∈Bii′
w(b)(bi′ − qi′) +
∑
b6∈Bii′
w(b) max
j∈[n]0
(bj − qj),
fB(r) =
∑
b∈Bii′
w(b)(bi − ri) +
∑
b6∈Bii′
w(b) max
j∈[n]0
(bj − rj).
Hence the inequality
fB(r) ≤ λfB(p) + (1− λ)fB(q) (12)
holds if and only if ∑
b∈Bii′
w(b)[(bi − qi)− (bi′ − qi′)] ≤ 0. (13)
Note that the term (bi − qi)− (bi′ − qi′) is strictly negative, as b demands i′ and not i at q.
Moreover, this term is the same for all bids b ∈ Bii′ , as i and i′ are both demanded at r. This
implies by (13) that
∑
b∈Bij w(b) ≥ 0 if and only if (12) holds.
Now we prove our main statement. Suppose fB restricted to P is not convex. Then there
exist p, q ∈ P and λ ∈ [0, 1] that violate (11). Due to continuity of fB, we can perturb p and
q slightly so that (11) is still violated, p, q are non-marginal and the line segment [p, q] crosses
only interiors of facets of the LIP LB. We can assume wlog that p and q are in neighbouring
UDRs; otherwise, we can apply Observation B.2 to find two non-marginal prices on the interior
of the line segment for which (11) fails. Thus we can apply the above to see the implication
2⇒ 1.
For the converse (1⇒ 2), suppose there exist r and i, i′ ∈ [n]0 such that the weights of bids
marginal on i, i′ at r sum to a negative number. Wlog we can assume that all marginal bids at
r are marginal only on goods i, i′, by subtracting δe{i,i′} from r for some infinitesimal positive
value of δ if necessary. Hence r lies on the interior of a facet F and for small enough ε > 0, the
points p = r + εei − εei′ and q = r − εei + εei′ lie in P and in neighbouring UDRs separated
by F . By the above, this implies that p and q with λ = 1/2 violate (11) and we are done.
Lemma B.3. Suppose G is an invertible matrix whose rows are strong substitute vectors (Defin-
ition B.1). Then there exists a diagonal matrix U multiplying some (possibly empty) set of rows
of G by −1, such that every column of UG contains exactly one +1 entry and such that the rows
of (UG)−1 contain at most two non-zero entries, and all non-zero entries of (UG)−1 are +1.
Proof. Note that any vector of the form ei − ej for i 6= j has zero inner product with ∑k ek
and conclude that, since G is invertible, at least one row of G is ± a coordinate vector. So there
exists an elementary row swapping operation T1, an elementary row multiplying operation U1
which multiplies one row by either +1 or −1, and an elementary column swapping operation
V1, such that T1U1GV1 = G′ whose first row is e1. Note that all of these elementary matrix
operations are themselves unimodular.
Because G′ is invertible we can apply the same logic to the matrix that remains when we
strike the first row and column from G′, obtaining a (n − 1) × (n − 1) submatrix whose first
row is the first coordinate vector. These elementary operations may be extended to the original
first row and column without changing the desired properties. Continuing in this fashion, we
obtain an expression TnUn · · ·T1U1GV1 · · ·Vn = G(n) such that G(n) is an lower triangular matrix
with 1s along its main diagonal, where for all i, Ui is an elementary row multiplying operation
which multiplies a row by either +1 or −1 and Ti, Vi are elementary row and column swapping
operations respectively. The rows of G(n) are still strong subsitute vectors and so any non-zero
entries below the main diagonal are −1s.
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It is clear that (G(n))−1 is given by the lower triangular matrix whose entries are the absolute
value of the entries of G(n). In particular, then, each row of (G(n))−1 contains at most two non-
zero entries, and all non-zero entries of (G(n))−1 are +1.
Now note that, by properties of elementary matrices, we may re-write TnUn · · ·T1U1 = TU
in which T is a permutation matrix and U multiplies some (possibly empty) set of rows by −1.
We may similarly write V1 · · ·Vn = V where V is a permutation matrix. So G(n) = TUGV .
Since T and V both simply permute rows and columns, we conclude that UG inherits from G(n)
the property that each column contains exactly one +1 entry.
Thus (G(n))−1 = V −1(UG)−1T−1 i.e. (UG)−1 = V (G(n))−1T . As the structure of permuta-
tion matrices are identical, whether they act on rows or columns, this implies that (UG)−1
inherits from (G(n))−1 the properties of each row containing at most two non-zero entries, and
all non-zero entries being equal to +1.
Lemma B.4. Suppose that G is an invertible n′ × n′ matrix whose rows are strong substitute
vectors (Definition B.1), and that Hi is the ith column of H = (hij)ni,j=1 :=
(
0
G2
)
where we
have written G in block form G =
(
G1
G2
)
. Then either G−1Hi = eS for some S ⊆ [n′] with
i ∈ S, or G−1Hi = −eS for some S ⊆ [n′] with i /∈ S.
Proof. By Lemma B.3 there exists a diagonal matrix U with +1 and −1 on its diagonal such that
the rows of (UG)−1 contain at most two non-zero entries, and all non-zero entries of (UG)−1
are +1, and each column of UG contains precisely one +1 entry. Observe that G−1Hi =
(UG)−1UHi. We may therefore replace G by UG for brevity in the proof.
By definition G−1Gi = ei. But each row of G−1 contains at most two non-zero entries, all
+1, so this is a stacked set of equations of the form gli = 0 or gli + gmi = 0 (with any indices
l 6= m with exceptionally one which takes the form of either gji = 1 or gji + gki = 1 (with some
indices j 6= k). The latter case correponds to the ith row of G−1. Since each gji ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
we conclude for the ith row that there exactly one non-zero entry in Gi which is aligned to a
non-zero entry in the ith row of G−1, and this entry is equal to +1. Write this as gji = 1, i.e. j
is the row in Gi of this entry.
Recall it follows that gki{−1, 0} for k 6= j. Translating this across to G−1Hi, we find there
are two cases:
If hji = gji = 1 then every incidence of “gli = 0” translates to “hli = 0” and so gives us a
zero entry in Hi; and every incidence of gli + gmi = 0 either translates to hli + hmi = 0 or to
hli + hmi = 1 (which holds if, w.l.o.g., gli = −1 but hli = 0; note that in this case it must follow
that gmi = 1 and hence that m = j and hence by assumption that hmi = 1). That is, every
entry in Hi is either 0 or +1, and in particular the ith entry is 1.
But suppose hji = 0 6= gji. It still holds that every incidence of “gli = 0” translates to
“hli = 0”. But now every incidence of gli + gmi = 0 either translates to hli + hmi = 0 or to
hli + hmi = −1. For if w.l.o.g. gli = −1 then gmi = 1 and so m = j and hmi = 0 and hence
hli + hmi ∈ {−1, 0}. That is, every entry in Hi is either 0 or −1, and in particular the ith entry
is 0.
Lemma B.5. Suppose that G is an n′×n matrix whose rows are strong subtitute vectors (Defin-
ition B.1) and that S ⊆ [n]. Then GeS ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and in particular GeS ≥ −1 (the vector of
1s).
Proof. Each row of GeS is the sum of a subset of the entries in the corresponding row of G, and
so by definition of strong substitue vectors it is only possible that this is ±1 or 0.
Proposition B.6. Suppose that we have two strong substitute integer-valued valuations, u1 and
u2. Fix i ∈ [n] and write u2[ε,i] for the valuation given by u2[ε,i](x) = u2(x) + εei · x. For any
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r1, r2 ∈ Zn suppose that there exists a price p∗ such that r1 ∈ Du1(p∗), and r2 ∈ Du2[ε,i](p∗).
Then there exists a price p0 such that r1 ∈ Du1(p0), and r2 ∈ Du2(p0). Moreover then, for any
p such that r := r1 + r2 ∈ Du{1,2}(p), it follows that r1 ∈ Du1(p), and r2 ∈ Du2(p).
Proof. For j = 1, 2 write P j for the set of prices p at which rj ∈ Duj (p). It follows from the
definition of u2[ε,i] that the set of prices p at which r2 ∈ Du2[ε,i](p) is equal to P 2 + {εei}. And
it follows by assumption that r1, r2 that P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εei}) 6= ∅.
By Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a, Proposition 2.7], P 1, P 2 are polyhedra in Rn, so each
may be written as those p such that:
Hjp ≥ Aj (14)
where Hj is an aj × n matrix for some aj ∈ Z+ and Aj ∈ Raj . Moreover by Baldwin and
Klemperer [2019a, Proposition 3.10], we can choose Hj such that each row of Hj is a strong
substitutes vector (Definition B.1) and then, as we assume each valuation uj is integer-valued,
also Aj ∈ Zaj . Then P 2 + {εei} is defined by
H2(p− εei) ≥ A2 ⇔ H2p ≥ A2 + εH2i (15)
where H2i is the ith column of H
2.
Write H =
(
H1
H2
)
and A =
(
A1
A2
)
, and Hˆ =
(
0
H2
)
, inequalities defining P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εei})
are:
Hp ≥ A+ εHˆi (16)
Now argue similarly to Theorem 19.1 in Schrijver [1998]. We know that P 1∩(P 2+{εei}) 6= ∅.
Let F = {p : H ′p = A′+ εHˆ ′i} be a minimal face of this intersection, where H ′p ≥ A′+ εHˆ ′i is a
subsystem of (16) with linearly independent rows. After possibly permuting the columns of H ′,
that is, the indices of the goods, we can write H ′ =
(
G G˜
)
where G is invertible. Moreover we
can chose this permutation such that the ith coordinate remains within the first square matrix
– that is, if G is n′×n′ then assume when we re-ordering that i ≤ n′. Moreover, G inherits from
H1, H2 the property that its rows are strong substitute vectors. Now define:
pε :=
(
G−1
(
A′ + εHˆ ′i
)
0
)
and p0 :=
(
G−1A′
0
)
Note p0 is an integer vector, since A is integer and G is unimodular. Moreover, we can apply
Lemma B.4: either G−1Hˆ ′i = e
S for some S ⊆ [n′], with i ∈ S or G−1Hˆ ′i = −eS for some S ⊆ [n′]
with i /∈ S (here n′ is the dimension of G). So, either pε = p0 + εeS for some S ⊆ [n] with i ∈ S
or pε = p0 − εeS for some S ⊆ [n] with i /∈ S. Moreover, in either case, pε − εei ∈ {p0 ± εeS′}
for some S′ ⊆ [n].
We also see immediately that pε is a vector in F , and hence in P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εei}). So (16)
holds at pε: Hpε ≥ A+ εHˆi. We will show that also p0 ∈ P 1 ∩ P 2.
First consider (14) for j = 1, which holds at pε. Note also that H1 has strong substitute
rows and (p0 − pε) ∈ ±εeS for S ⊆ [n], so applying Lemma B.5 together with (14):
H1p0 = H1pε +H1(p0 − pε) ≥ A1 − ε1.
The rows of H1p0 and A1 are integer, and ε ∈ (0, 1), so H1p0 ≥ A1.
Next consider that (15) holds at pε. Again H2 has strong substitute rows and this time use
that (p0 − pε + εei) ∈ ±εeS′ for S′ ⊆ [n], so applying Lemma B.5 together with (15):
H2p0 = H2(pε − εei) +H2(p0 − pε + εei) ≥ A2 − ε1.
Again, the rows of H2p0 and A2 are integer, and ε ∈ (0, 1), so H2p0 ≥ A2. Thus we have
established that p0 ∈ P 1 ∩ P 2, as required to show that rj ∈ Duj (p0) for j = 1, 2.
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Now take any p such that r := r1+r2 ∈ Du{1,2}(p), and suppose that sj ∈ Duj (p) for j = 1, 2
with r = s1+s2: we have an equilibrium with potentially a different allocation of bundles across
the two agents. By Mas-Colell et al. [1995, Proposition 2.F.1] we know that for j = 1, 2 we have
(sj−rj)·(p−p0) ≤ 0, with equality holding only if the agent is indifferent between both bundles
at both prices. So, adding across j = 1, 2, we obtain ((s1 + s2)− r) · (p−p0) ≤ 0, with equality
holding only if the two agents are both indifferent between both bundles at both prices. But as
s1 + s2 = r it must indeed follow that ((s1 + s2) − r) · (p − p0) = 0 and so in particular that
also rbj ∈ Duj (p) for i = 1, 2, as required.
Proof of Proposition 4.14. Re-label so that bidder j has valuation u2 and the aggregate valuation
from all remaining agents is u1. We know that r ∈ Du{1,2}(p) by definition of an allocation
problem.
As in Proposition B.6 we write u2[ε,i] for the valuation given by u2[ε,i](x) = u2(x) + εei · x.
Since both u1 and u2[ε,i] are strong substitute valuations, there exists a price p∗ ∈ Rn such
that r ∈ Du1,2[ε,i](p∗), and thus there exist r1, r2 ∈ Zn such that r1 + r2 = r and such that
r2 ∈ Du1(p∗), r2 ∈ Du2[ε,i](p∗). By Proposition B.6 it follows that rj ∈ Duj (p) for j = 1, 2.
As in Proposition B.6 write P j for the set of prices p′ at which rj ∈ Duj (p′), and observe
that the set of prices p′ at which r2 ∈ Du2[ε,i](p′) is equal to P 2 + {εei}. We know that
p ∈ P 1 ∩P 2 (so this is non-empty) and p∗ ∈ P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εei}) (so this is non-empty). We seek
pε ∈ P 1∩(P 2+{εei}) with pε ∈ p±εeS for some S ⊆ [n]; this is sufficient for r ∈ Du{1,2[ε,i]}(pε),
as we require.
As at line (14) above we express both polyhedra as H ip′ ≥ Aj , where rows of Hj are strong
substitutes vectors. Therefore P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εei}) is defined by the set of inequalties:
H1p′ ≥ A1 and H2(p′ − εei) ≥ A2 (17)
Now, for j = 1, 2, let
(Hj)′p′ ≥ (Aj)′ (18)
be the subsystem of Hjp′ ≥ Aj consisting of all rows which hold with equality at p. (If both
of these subsystems are empty then subsequent arguments will simply set pε = p). Write
H =
(
(H1)′
(H2)′
)
, A =
(
(A1)′
(A2)′
)
and Hˆ =
(
0
(H2)′
)
. Thus when we stack the corresponding rows
of (17) we obtain the new system:
Hp′ ≥ A+ εHˆi. (19)
This defines a superset of P 1∩(P 2+ε), since we have already removed some rows fromHjp′ ≥ Aj
for j = 1, 2. But p∗ ∈ P 1 ∩ (P 2 + ε) so (19) defines a non-empty polytope. So let F = {p′ :
H ′p′ = A′ + εHˆ ′i} be a minimal face of this polytope, where
H ′p′ ≥ A′ + εHˆ ′i (20)
is a subsystem of (19) with linearly independent rows.
After possibly permuting the columns of H ′, that is, the indices of all goods, we can write
H ′ =
(
G G˜
)
, where G is invertible. Moreover we can choose this perumtation such that the
ith coordinate remains within the first square matrix – that is, if G is n′×n′ then assume when
we re-order that i ≤ n′. Correspondingly write p′ =
(
p′1
p′2
)
So our system (19) is now written:
(
G G˜
)(p′1
p′2
)
≥ A′ + εHˆ ′i. (21)
Observe that, by definition of the rows we identified at (18), we have
(
G G˜
)(p1
p2
)
= A′ and
so p1 = G−1A′ −G−1G˜p2. Write now:
pε :=
(
G−1(A′ + εHˆ ′i)−G−1G˜p2
p2.
)
(22)
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so that
H ′pε =
(
G G˜
)
pε = A′ + εHˆ ′i. (23)
We wish to show that (17) holds for p′ = pε. We can immediately observe that pε − p =(
εG−1Hˆ ′i
0
)
. So, by Lemma B.4, either pε = p+εeS for some S ⊆ [n] with i ∈ S, or pε = p−εeS
where S ⊆ [n] with i /∈ S. Moreover, in either case, pε − εei ∈ {p± εeS′} for some S′ ⊆ [n].
We also immediately observe that pε satisfies (20) with equality, and so pε ∈ F . Thus by
definition of F , also pε satisfies (19). It follows by definition of (18) that, for every row in the
original systems Hjp′ ≥ Aj that holds with equality at p, the corresponding shifted equation
in (17) holds at pε. It remains to show that this is also true for rows that are slack at p. Let
(Hj)′′p′ ≥ (Aj)′′ be the subsystems of such rows, for j = 1, 2, and observe that by integrality it
follows that
(Hj)′′p ≥ (Aj)′′ + 1. (24)
Now, applying Lemma B.5 and (24) for j = 1, we obtain:
(H1)′′pε = (H1)′′p + (H1)′′(pε − p) ≥ (A1)′′ + (1− ε)1 ≥ (A1)′′.
And applying Lemma B.5 to pε − p− εei, and (24) for j = 2
(H2)′′(pε − εei) = (H2)′′p + (H2)′′(pε − p− εei) ≥ (A2)′′ + (1− ε)1 ≥ (A2)′′.
So, for every row in the original systems Hjp′ ≥ Aj that is slack at p, the corresponding shifted
equation in (17) holds for pε. This completes the proof that pε ∈ P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εei}).
It follows that r ∈ Du1,2[ε,i](pε), which was constructed to be positioned relative to p as
described in the proposition.
Finally, recall that the prices at which r is demanded are equivalent to the prices that
minimise the Lyapunov function g(p) = fB(p) + r.p. It is known that fB (and thus g) are
submodular [Murota and Shioura, 2014, Theorem 7.2], so
h+(S) := g(p + εeS)− g(p), h−(S) := g(p + εeS)− g(p),
are submodular set functions. Hence in order to determine a price pε ∈ {p + εeS | S ⊆ [n]} at
which r is demanded, we find minimisers S+ and S− of h+ and h− using SFM, then let
pε = arg min
{
g
(
p + εeS
+
)
, g
(
p− εeS−
)}
.
Note that we do not require minimal submodular minimisers to find pε, and so this step takes
2T (n) time, where T (n) is the time is takes to perform submodular minimisation on h±. We
also note that finding pε is analogous to finding a steepest descent direction in Section 3.
Proof of Lemma 4.17. First we show that every edge in GA′ is present in GA. To see this, fix
some bid b and note by Observation 4.5 and Lemma 4.16 that Steps 1, 2 and 3 do not make b
marginal on any new goods.
Secondly we prove that for any multi-bidder cycle C with cycle-link good i∗ and incident
label j∗, Procedure 3 removes at least one of the edges of C from the marginal bids graph.
Re-label the goods going around cycle C as 1, . . . , k, so that 1 = i∗ and so that bidder j∗ placed
the bid marginal between goods 1 and 2. Also, for convenience, index the marginal bid that is
marginal between goods i and i + 1 as “i”, and index the marginal bid between goods k and 1
as “k”. Thus b1 ∈ Bj∗ and bk /∈ Bj∗ . (In general the differently labelled bids need not be from
different bidders). The existence of a marginal bid between goods i and i + 1 means that we
have an equality
bii − pi = bii+1 − pi+1 (25)
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for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, and also
bkk − pk = bk1 − p1 (26)
But if we take the sum of the first k − 1 equations, and cancel, we find
k−1∑
i=1
bii −
k−1∑
i=1
bii+1 =
k−1∑
i=1
(pi − pp+1) = p1 − pk
So it must hold that
k−1∑
i=1
(bii − bii+1) = bk1 − bkk (27)
For any bid b in the multi-sets (Bj)j∈J of bids, fixed j∗ ∈ J and i∗ ∈ [n], let
b˜ :=
{
b + 110e
i∗ b ∈ Bj∗
b otherwise
Suppose we replace each bid b by b˜ as above and recompute the prices. Since prices shift by
at most 110 , a bid that is not marginal on a pair of goods, cannot become marginal on them. If we
assume for a contradiction that all edges in C are all still present in G′ then we can write down
similar expressions to (25) and (26) (w.r.t. new prices), then eliminate those prices obtaining
a version of (27), namely
∑k−1
i=1 ((b˜
i)i − ((b˜i)i+1) = ((b˜k)1 − ((b˜k)k. But by definition of b˜, we
know that
k−1∑
i=1
((b˜i)i − ((b˜i)i+1) =
k−1∑
i=1
(bii − bii+1) +
1
10
,
(b˜k)1 − (b˜i)k = bk1 − bkk.
This is inconsistent with (27), so we have the required contradiction.
C Hardness of testing validity of unrestricted bid sets
Here we show that the question of whether a set of bids is valid is co-NP-complete. We also
present a simple algorithm verifying the validity of a given list of positive and negative unit bids
that runs in polynomial time if the number of goods, or the number of negative bids, is bounded
by a constant. For any list of bids B, let B+ and B− denote the positive and negative bids.
C.1 Checking validity is co-NP-complete
Definition C.1. Given a list of positive and negative bids B, the problem Valid Bids is to
decide whether B is valid.
Theorem C.2 (Theorem 2.4). Valid Bids is co-NP-complete.
The proof of Theorem C.2 uses an equivalent definition of validity for the list of bids. Define
regions in Rn+ that are generated by a point p and coordinates i, j ∈ [n] as follows.
Hpi := {x ∈ Rn+ | x ≤ p, xi = pi} (28)
F pij := {x+ βe[n] | β ∈ R+,x ≤ p, xi = pi and xj = pj .} (29)
We say that Hpi or F
p
ij is negative for a list of bids if it contains more negative than positive
bids, otherwise it is non-negative.
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Observation C.3. For any x,y ∈ Rn+, we have x ∈ F yij if and only if (x− y)i = (x− y)j and
x− (x− y)i1 ≤ y.
Observation C.4. Fix i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j. Then containment in the regions given in (28) and (29)
is transitive in the sense that, for any x,y, z ∈ Rn+,
• x ∈ Hyi and y ∈ Hzi , implies x ∈ Hzi .
• x ∈ F yij and y ∈ F zij, implies x ∈ F zij.
The following definition of valid bids restates the definition given in Theorem 2.3, 3., in terms
of regions (28) and (29).
Definition C.5 (Valid bids). A list of positive and negative bids is valid if, for any point
p ∈ Rn+ and two coordinates i, j ∈ [n], Hpi and F pij are non-negative.
On the basis of Definition C.5, the proof of Theorem 2.4 works by reducing the well-known
NP-complete problem 3-CNF Satisfiability to Valid Bids by means of an intermediate NP-
complete decision problem More Negatives Dominated, which we define in Definition C.6.
The NP-completeness of More Negatives Dominated is established in Theorem C.7 and
the reduction from More Negatives Dominated to Valid Bids is given below as the proof
of Theorem 2.4. For any two points x,y ∈ Rn, we say that x dominates y if xi ≥ yi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition C.6. Given two lists P and N of vectors in Rn+, More Negatives Dominated
is the problem of deciding whether there exists a vector z ∈ Rn+ that dominates more vectors in
N than in P .
Theorem C.7. The problem More Negatives Dominated is NP-complete.
Proof. Note that verifying whether a given point z ∈ Rn+ dominates more vectors in N than in P
can be done in polynomial time. This establishes membership ofMore Negatives Dominated
in the class NP. We show completeness by reducing from 3-CNF Satisfiability. Recall that
a boolean formula φ defined on n variables x1, . . . , xn is 3-CNF if
φ =
m∧
i=1
Ci,
where Ci = Li1 ∨ Li2 ∨ Li3 are its clauses and Lij ∈ {x1, . . . , xn, x1, . . . , xn} are its literals. Here
xi denotes the negation of xi. Without loss of generality, we assume that the three variables
appearing in each clause are distinct. Given such a 3-CNF formula φ, first construct a pair of
lists (Pi, Ni) of vectors in Rn+ for each clause Ci as follows. For notational convenience, ea...z
denotes the characteristic vector e{a,...,z} of {a, . . . , z}.
• If Ci = xa ∨ xb ∨ xc, let Ni = {e∅} and Pi = {eabc}.
• If Ci = xa ∨ xb ∨ xc, let Ni = {e∅, eabc} and Pi = {eab}.
• If Ci = xa ∨ xb ∨ xc, let Ni = {e∅, eab, eac} and Pi = {ea, eabc}.
• If Ci = xa ∨ xb ∨ xc, let Ni = {ea, eb, ec, eabc} and Pi = {eab, eac, ebc}.
Finally, letN be the sum of theNi and let P be the sum of the Pi together withm−1 copies of e∅.
This completes our reduction from 3-CNF Satisfiability to More Negatives Dominated.
Clearly, P and N can be constructed from φ in polynomial time. To show correctness of the
reduction, associate with every vector z ∈ Rn+ a truth assignment βz (on boolean variables
x1, . . . , xn) that sets xi to true if zi < 1 and false otherwise.
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Observation C.8. Let z ∈ Rn+ be a point and βz be its associated truth assignment. For any
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, z dominates one more point in Ni than in Pi if βz satisfies Ci and an equal
number of points in Ni and Pi if βz does not satisfy Ci.
Suppose φ is a satisfiable 3-CNF formula with satisfying truth assignment β. Then define
z ∈ Rn+ by
zi =
{
0 if β[xi] = true,
1 else.
Hence β is the truth assignment associated with z. By Observation C.8, z dominates one more
point in Ni than in Pi for each i, so due to the additional m− 1 origin points e∅ added to P , z
dominates exactly one more point in N than in P .
Conversely, suppose there exists a point z ∈ Rn+ that dominates more points in N than in
P , and let βz be its corresponding truth assignment. Then z dominates at least m more points
in N than in
∑m
i=1 Pi. By Observation C.8, we know that z dominates at most one more point
in Ni than in Pi, which implies that this is the case for each i. Hence by the same observation,
βz satisfies all clauses of φ and thus φ itself.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. In order to show that a list of bids B is not valid, it suffices to provide a
certificate in the form of a point p and coordinates i, j ∈ [n]. We can verify in polynomial time
whether Hpi or F
p
ij is negative. This establishes membership of Valid Bids in co-NP.
Let (N,P ) be an instance of More Negatives Dominated and n be the dimension of its
vectors. We construct an (n + 1)-dimensional instance B of Valid Bids such that (N,P ) ∈
More Negatives Dominated if and only if B 6∈ Valid Bids as follows. Let the negative and
positive bids of B be given by
B− = {(v, 1) | v ∈ N}
and
B+ = {(w, 1) | w ∈ P}+ {(v, 0) | v ∈ N}+ {(v, 1) + e[n+1] | v ∈ N}.
Clearly, B = B+ + B− can be constructed efficiently. Note that all F xij and all Hxi with
i 6= n + 1 are non-negative by construction. Indeed, fix F xij and suppose it contains r negative
bids. Then for each such bid (v, 1), where v ∈ N , there exists a positive bid (v, 1) + e[n+1]
that is contained F xij , so that is is non-negative. Analogously, for any H
x
i with i 6= n + 1, each
negative bid (v, 1) has a corresponding positive bid (v, 0).
Further, a Hxn+1 contain no negative points unless xn+1 = 1, the correctness of our reduction
thus follows from the fact that z dominates r points from N and s points from P if and only if
Hxn+1 with x = (z, 1) contains r negative and s positive bids.
C.2 A simple algorithm testing validity
Given the co-NP-completeness result above, we cannot expect an efficient algorithm for the task
of checking validity of a list of bids in the general case. Here we present a simple algorithm that
tests validity of a given list of bids in polynomial time if the number of goods or the number
of negative bids is bounded by a constant. Such constraints may be reasonable in certain
economic settings. Our algorithm rests on Theorem C.9, which reduces the validity condition
from Definition C.5 to a finite number of checks. Lemma C.10 reduces the number of checks
further. Together, the two results immediately yield an algorithm whose running time is given
in Theorem C.11.
For any set of bids U , define the minimal dominating vector md(U) of U as the component-
wise maximum over U ,
md(U) :=
∨
b∈U
b.
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If all bids of U agree on some coordinate i (that is, if bi = b′i for all b, b
′ ∈ U), they lie in Hxi
for large enough x, and md(U) is the minimal such x so that Hxi contains all points in U .
Similarly, for any set of bids U and i ∈ [n], define mdF (i, U) as
mdF (i, U) := min
b∈U
bi1+md({b− bi1 | b ∈ U}).
If, for some i 6= j, the set U satisfies bi − bj = b′i − b′j for all b, b′ ∈ U , then the bids in U lie
in F xij for small enough x, and it follows from Observation C.3 that mdF (i, U) = mdF (j, U) is
the maximal such x.
Theorem C.9. A list of bids B is valid if and only if the following two conditions hold.
1. For every set U ⊆ B− of negative bids that agree on the i-th coordinate, that is bi =
b′i ∀b, b′ ∈ U , the region Hmd(U)i is non-negative.
2. For every set U ⊆ B− of negative bids that satisfies bi − b′i = bj − b′j for all b, b′ ∈ U and
some i 6= j, the region FmdF (i,U)ij is non-negative.
Proof. The implication is immediate by Definition C.5. Conversely, suppose B satisfies the
second condition. First we show that condition 1 of Definition C.5 is satisfied. Fix Hxi , let
U = B− ∩Hxi be the set of negative bids in Hxi and y = md(U). Then by construction, we have
b ∈ Hyi for all b ∈ U and y ∈ Hxi . As Hyi has |U | negative bids, it also contains at least |U |
positive bids by assumption and by Observation C.4, these positive bids are also in Hxi .
Condition 2 is shown analogously. Fix F xij , let U be the negative bids in this region and
z = mdF (U). Suppose b ∈ F zij for every b ∈ U and z ∈ F xij . Then Observation C.4 implies
that F xij is non-negative. To see that b ∈ F zij for every b ∈ U , we verify the conditions of
Observation C.3. Firstly,
zi − zj = min
b∈U
bi − (min
b∈U
bi + max
b∈U
(bj − bi)) = max
b∈U
(bj − bi) = bj − bi
for all b ∈ U , as the difference bj − bi is the same for all b ∈ F zij . Secondly, for any k ∈ [n] and
b ∈ U , we have
(b− (bi − zi)1)k = zi + bk − bi ≤ zi + max
b∈U
(bk − bi) = zk.
We can verify z ∈ F xij similarly.
Lemma C.10. For any list of negative bids U ⊆ B− there exists a list U ′ ⊆ U with |U ′| ≤ n
so that md(U ′) = md(U). Moreover, for each coordinate i ∈ [n], there exists a list U ′′ ⊆ U with
|U ′′| ≤ n+ 1 so that mdF (i, U ′′) = mdF (i, U).
Proof. Let U ′ be a list of bids u1, . . . ,un, where uk is a bid from U that maximises the k-
th component, i.e. uk ∈ arg maxv∈U vk. Then md(U ′) = md(U) by construction. Secondly,
fix i ∈ [n] and let U ′′ be a list of bids u1, . . . ,un+1, where u1 ∈ arg minb∈U bi and uk ∈
arg maxb∈U (bk − bi) for k ∈ {2, . . . , n+ 1}. Then mdF (U ′′) = mdF (U) by construction and we
are done.
Algorithm for checking the validity of a list of unit bids B. For each subset U ⊆ B−
of negative bids with |U | ≤ n+ 1, and each i, j ∈ [n], verify the two conditions of Theorem C.9.
Theorem C.11. Our algorithm runs in time O
((|B−|
n
)
n3|B|
)
. Moreover, if |B−| ≤ k or n ≤ k,
the algorithm is polynomial in the input size n|B|.
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Proof. There are
(|B−|
n+1
)
subsets U of B− for the algorithm to iterate over, while there are n2
possibilities for the index pair i, j. For each U and i, j, checking the conditions in Theorem C.9
takes n|B| time. This implies the running time.
Suppose the number of negative bids |B−| ≤ k is bounded by some k ∈ N. Then (|B−|n+1) is
constant and the running time of our algorithm is O(n3(|V |+ |W |)). Secondly, if the number of
goods n ≤ k is bounded, we have (|B−|n+1) ≤ |B−|k+1 and hence a running time of O(|B−|k+1|B|).
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